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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.
This case arises from the administrative bid process of the Idaho Department of

Administration's ("IDA") implementation of the Idaho Education Network. See Idaho Code
§ 67-5745(D).

At the end of the day, after completion of the administrative bid process,

including Il)A's Request for Proposals, the Responses to the RFP, the Notice of Award, IDA's
issuance of the Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPOs") to Qwest Communications
Company, LLC, ("Qwest") and to ENA Services, LLC, a division of Education Networks of
America, Inc. ("ENA"), and the defined scope of services to be purchased from Qwest and ENA
as provided in an amendment to the two SBPOs, Syringa Networks, LLC ("Syringa") sat as a
disappointed subcontractor because its expectation of work was no longer there.

Syringa's

reaction was to file a direct civil action against IDA for(!) breach of contract, (2) declaratory
relief for alleged violation of Idaho Code § 67-5726, and (3) declaratory relief for alleged
violation of Idaho Code§ 67-5718(A), and a claim oftortious interference with contract against
IDA, the Administrator J. Michael Gwartney ("Gwartney"), and the Chief Information Officer
Jack G. Zickau ("Zickau").

Additionally, Syringa included causes of action for tortious

interference with contract and with prospective economic advantage against Qwest, and further
alleged that ENA had breached a Teaming Agreement. R., pp. 27-29 (Verified Complaint).
B.

Course Of Proceedings Below.
IDA, Gwartney and Zickau (collectively, the "State Defendants") moved for summary

judgment on the claims for breach of contract, and declaratory relief (LC. § 67-5726/I.C. § 67571 B(A)) on the alternative grounds that Syringa lacked standing to sue IDA and/or that its
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claims were barred due to Syringa's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. IDA, Gwartney
and Zickau moved to dismiss the tortious interference with contract claim because it was barred
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-904(3).

On July 23, 2010, the District Court granted summary

judgment on the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims due to Syringa's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. R., pp. 1153-1157 (Substit11te Memorandum Decision and
Order). Pursuant to stipulation, the parties agreed to complete fact discovery prior to the District
Court's. hearing the motion for summary judgment on Count 4 (Tortious Interference \vith
Contract).
Syringa filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 23, 2010 Substitute
Memorandum Decision and Order on the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint. Syringa
argued that there was no administrative remedy to exhaust associated with the amended SBPOs .
. R., p. 1657 (Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Reconsider). The District Court rejected
Syringa's argument because it does not read l.C. § 67-5733 so narrowly. Id. at 1658-59. The
District Court held that, "Syringa did not exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging these
awards and cannot now resort to the Court to challenge the awards. See, e.g., Lochsa Falls, LLC

v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2009)." R., p. 1659. Accordingly, the District Court
denied the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 1660.
On February 9, 2011, the District Court granted the State Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on Count 4 of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) IDA is immune
from liability on the tortious interference claim under LC. § 6-904; (2) Syringa failed to
overcome the presumption that Zickau acted within the course and scope of his employment,
without malice and without criminal intent; and (3) Syringa failed to overcome the presumption
.that Gwartney acted within the course and scope of his employment, without malice and without
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criminal intent. R., pp. 2582, 2585 and 2587 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions
for Summary Judgment). Syringa now appeals the District Court's dismissal of Counts 2, 3
and 4 of the complaint.
C.

Counterstatement Of Facts.
In 2008, the Idaho State Legislature authorized the creation of a "statewide coordinated

and funded high-band width Education Network" called the Idaho Education Nenvork ("IEN").
2008 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 260 § 3 (codified at LC. § 67-5745(0)). The IEN was meant to be
")he coordinated, statewide telecommunications distribution system for distance learning for
each public school."

LC. § 67-5745(D)(2).

The legislation assigned IDA the oversight

responsibility for development and implementation of the IEN.

2008 Idaho Sess. Laws,

Ch. 260 § 3. IDA was to "[p]rocure telecommunication services and equipment for the IEN
through an open and competitive bidding process," Id.
In December of2008, IDA issued the IEN Request for Proposals 02160 ("RFP"), seeking
bids for the initial phase of the IEN project. R., disc 12, Affidavit of Mark Little, Exh. A (IEN
RFP 02160 dated 12/15/2008). The RFP provided that "[s]trong consideration will be given to
proposals that incm:porate partnerships between multiple providers."

Id. at p. 22 (RFP

at§ 3.3(b)). The RFP also specified that "[a]ny resulting contract from this solicitation will be
awarded up to four providers." Id. at p. 31 (RFP at § 5.3). In Amendment 4 of the RFP dated
January 6, 2009, the language was changed to "any resulting contract from this solicitation may
be awarded up to four providers." R., disc 12, Affidavit of Mark Little, Exh. E (IEN RFP 02160
Amendment 4 dated 1/6/2009 at p. 5) (emphasis added).
The RFP contained the following limitation: "Bidders must also have a service provider
identification number from the Universal Service Administrative Company and be eligible to
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participate in the Universal Service Fund Discount Program for Telecommunication Services
provided to the E-Rate Eligible Entities." Id., Exh. A, p. 21 (RFP at § 3.2).

Only E-Rate

services providers could bid on the RFP. Id.; R., p. 2557.l
The RFP provided that "the state reserves the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly
or in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part. All awards will be made in a
manner deemed in the best interest of the State." R., disc 12, Aff. M. Little, Exh. A, p. 14 (RFP
at § 2 "Award"). The RFP contemplated that the different schools across the state would have
different needs of connectivity services and provided that: "The state shall not be required to
purchase any specific service or minimum quantities of network services. The quantities
provided in this RFP as examples are for the sole purpose of assisting the Bidders in preparation
of their proposals and for the State to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed network solutions.

... " Id., Exh. A, p. 47 (RFP at§ 10) (emphasis added).
Syringa and ENA entered into a "Teaming Agreement" for the purpose of jointly
responding to the RFP. R., pp. 1858-1860. The "Teaming Agreement" provided in relevant
part:

2.

TEAMING

a.
Purpose. ENA is seeking to become either (i) the
Prime Contractor for the Project or (ii) the prime contractor for the
portion of the Project which provides all services to schools and
libraries. IfENA or Syringa are awarded the Prime Contract, ENA
and Syringa shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which
Syringa shall provide connectivity services statewide to ENA. The
purpose of this agreement is to define the parties' respective rights
and obligations in connection with the Proposal, the Project, and
the Prime Contract.

l

E-Rate status refers to telecommunication and internet access companies that are qualified to
receive funding under the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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b.
Relationship. The parties agree that, as between the parties,
ENA will be the prime contractor for either (i) the Project or (ii)
the prime contractor for the portion of the Project which provides
all services to schools and libraries, and, if ENA wins the Prime
Contract, Syringa will provide connectivity services in connection
with the Project. The parties will be independent contractors with
respect to this agreement and the Project.

h.
Termination.
This agreement will tenninate without
liability upon any of the following events:
i.
The customer formerly and finally rejects the
Proposal or cancels the Project; ...

iii.

Service Agreement.

(a)
Generally. If ENA wins the Prime Contract
as provided in Section 2(a) above, the paiiies shall execute a
Partnership Agreement as specified in this agreement that will also
include any required flow-down provisions or other appropriate
terms similai· to those set foiih in the Prime Contract.
(b)
ENA Responsibilities. If ENA wms the
Project as provided in Section 2(a) above, in connection with
performing the Prime Contract, EN A shall be responsible for the
following functions for all paiiicipating schools and libraries:
(i) procuring and owning all customer premises equipment,
(ii) coordinating field service, (iii) managing the customer
relationship, (iv) serving as the fiscal and contracting agent,
including responsibility for invmcmg and collections,
(v) management ofE-Rate Funds and (vi) procuring, managing and
provisioning last mile circuits.
(c)
Syringa Responsibilities. If ENA wins the
Project as provided in Section 2(a) above, in connection with
performing the Prime Contract, Syringa shall be responsible for
(i) providing the statewide backbone for the services, (ii) providing
and operating a network operation center for the backbone,
(iii) providing for co-location of core network equipment,
(iv) procuring and owning all customer premises not provided by
ENA, (v) coordinating field service for non-school or library sites,
(vi) managing the customer relationship for non-school or librai·y
sites, and (vii) procuring, managing, and provisioning last mile
circuits for non-school or library sites.
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Id.

Under the Teaming Agreement, Syringa intended on becoming ENA's subcontractor to

provide the connectivity services required by the !EN !! ENA was awarded the whole contract
and IDA purchased such services from ENA.

On January 12, 2009, Syringa and ENA jointly responded to the RFP by submitting a
proposal printed on stationary that displayed logos for both Syringa and ENA at the top of each
page, and they called themselves the "!EN Alliance." R., p. 163. The cover letter to the !EN
Alliance Proposal states: "The !EN Alliance founding members, ENA and Syringa will lead the
partnership. For the purpose of executing a contract, ENA will be the contracting entity for the
Project with Syringa as the principal partner and prime supplier." Id. at I69. The !EN Alliance
Proposal identified EN A and ENA, Inc. as the service providers who were registered with the
USAC. Id. at 269. The RFP required a bidder to submit a signed signature page on an IDA
supplied form. The signature page for the !EN Alliance bid proposal was signed by David M.
Pierce, President and CEO of ENA. Id. at 467. The signature page identified the bidder/offeror
as "Education Networks of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC." Id.
IDA also received responsive proposals from Qwest and Verizon Business Network
Services, Inc. Id. at 581 (January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent to Award). On January 20, 2009,
IDA issued a letter of intent to award to "Qwest Communications, LLC and Education Networks
of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC for being awarded the most points." Id.
On January 28, 2009, IDA issued a Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to Qwest
(SBPO 1308) and a Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to ENA (SBPO 1309).

Id. at 582

and 584.
On February 26, 2009, IDA issued Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and Amendment 1 to
SBPO 1309. Id. at 588-593. Each Amendment stated: "It is the intent of the State of Idaho to
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amend SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] to clarify the rules and responsibilities of the parties to the
agreement." Id. at 588 and 592. Each amendment also stated: "The State considers Qwest and
ENA eqnal partners in the IEN Project as demonstrated in the Intent to Award Letter dated
January 20, 2009 and the snbseqnent SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] dated Jannary 28, 2009." Id.
at 589 and 593. The Amendments clarify the scope of work for both Qwest and ENA, such that
Qwest would be the general contractor in coordination with ENA, for all IEN technical network
services, and ENA will be the Service Provider listed on the State's federal E-Rate Form 471 and
will coordinate delivery of all IEN network services and support. Id. at 588 and 592. The effect
of Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and to SBPO 1309 was to assign to Qwest the "entire scope of
work assigned to Syringa in the Teaming Agreement and the IEN Alliance Proposal." Id. at
1144.
Prior to filing its Complaint, Syringa did not seek any form of administrative relief from
the IEN RFP specifications, the awards to ENA and Qwest, or to the amended awards. Id.

.II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether an alternative ground exists to affirm the District Court's summary

judgment on Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint, i.e., Syringa lacked standing to sue IDA
2.

Whether the State Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal

pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117(1), § 12-120(3), and § 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
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III.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard Of Review.

The standard of review by the Idaho Supreme Court of an order from the District Court
granting summary judgment is de novo. When this Court "reviews a District Court's grant of
summary judgment, it uses the same standard properly employed by the District Court originally
ruling on the motion." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996
P.2d. 303, 306 (2000). Under that standard, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of establishing
the lack of a genuine issue of mate1ial fact Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600,
944 P .2d 1360, 1363 ( 1997). To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion
and establish through evidence that no issue of material fact exists for an element of the
nonmoving party's case. Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d
583, 588 (1996).
The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Venters v. Sorrento

Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 250, 208 P.3d 392, 397 (2005). A "mere scintilla of evidence"

that creates only "slight doubt as to the facts" is not enough to avoid summary judgment. NW:
Bee-Corp v. Homeliving Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002). Moreover, while

the moving party generally bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of material facts, a
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failure of proof on an essential element of the opposing party's case makes all other facts
immaterial. Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988).

· B.

This Court Should Affirm The J)istriet Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment On
Counts 2 And 3 Of The Complaint On The Alternate Ground That Syringa Lacked
Standing To Sue IDA.
In deciding IDA' s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 1 (Breach of Contract), 2

(Declaratory Relief LC. § 67-5726), and 3 (Declaratory Relief I.C. § 67-5718(A)), the District
Court concluded that Syringa had standing to pursue its claims for declaratory relief. Id. at
U53.6 IDA submits that the District Court's conclusion was in en·or. Standing is jurisdictional
and can be raised as a basis to dismiss the action at any time. Beach lateral Water Users Ass 'n

v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 603, 130 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2006).
This Court exercises "free review over questions of jurisdiction, and such questions must
be addressed prior to reaching the merits of an appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709
(2009). "It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a
court's jurisdiction must have standing." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105, 44
P.3d 1157, 1159-60 (2002). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court
before reaching the merits of the case." Idl

2

1

Count I of Syringa's Complaint brought a breach of contract claim against IDA, even though
Syringa was never party to any contract with IDA R. at pp. 5 - 12 (Count One). Syringa has
not appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim against IDA
The Court may affirm the District Court's decision if an alternative basis to support such a
decision exists. See Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644 (2011). Standing is both an
issue on cross-appeal and an alternative basis for affirming the District Court's decision.
Either. way, given that standing is a jurisdictional issue, it must be addressed before the
merits of the case. Young, 137 Idaho at 104-105.
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The doctrine of standing is a subcategory of justiciability. Id. "Standing focuses on the
party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Id. "To satisfy
the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in
fact and a substantial likelihood the reliefrequested will prevent or redress the claimed injury."

Id. "This requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Id.
Syringa's Second and Third causes of action seek a declaratory judgment that the
amended SBPOs did not comply with Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(A) and 67-5726 and should be
voided. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render declaratory
judgments, but it does not "relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in
the first instance." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006).
1.

Disappointed Bidders do Not Have Standing to Challenge an Award Absent
Legislation Authorizing the Challenge.

In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., the United States Supreme Court held that a disappointed
bidder for a federal government contract does not have standing to sue the government for
violations of bidding rules contained in the Federal Public Contracts Act. Perkins v. Lukens

Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1940). In affinning the view that "bidders have no standing in
the courts," the Court focused on the absence of legislation authorizing disappointed bidders to
challenge the award of government contracts. Id. (explaining that "neither the damage nor loss
of income in consequence of the action of the Government, which is not an invasion of a legally
recognized right, is itself a source of the legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation
recognizing it as such.") ("emphasis added). The Court further explained that "Courts should
not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchasing agencies of Government to the delays
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necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sellers .... " Id at 13 0
(emphasis added).
Subsequent to Perkins, federal and state governments have passed legislation allowing
disappointed bidders to challenge the award of government contracts under limited
circumstances. For example, "The Tucker Act, as amended by the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA), gives [the Federal Court of Claims] jurisdiction in bid protest actions
and confers standing on an 'interested party' objecting to a proposed contract or to a proposed
award or award of a contract." Eagle Design & Mgmt. v. United States, 62 Fed. CL 106, 108109 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(l)). The term "interested party" is defined as an
"actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the
award of the contract or failure to award the contract." Id Given that the legislation only
authorizes an "actual or prospective bidder" to protest the award of a government contract, a
subcontractor lacks standing to bring such a challenge. Id. at I 06 ("Because Eagle Design was a
. subcontractor to an offeror in this procurement and was not itself an actual or prospective
offeror, it is not an interested patty within the meaning of this Court's authorizing legislation as
construed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As such, Eagle Design
. lacks standing to bring this post-award bid protest."); see also Pure Power!, Inc. v. United States,
70 Fed. Cl. 739, 745 (Fed. Cl. 2006) ("Because plaintiff is 'properly characterized as, at best, a
prospective supplier or subcontractor to Mack Trucks, rather than an actual or prospective bidder
on a government solicitation, plaintiff cannot qualify as an interested party with standing.").
State and federal courts throughout the country have held that subcontractors or other
non-bidders lack standing, especially where the subcontractor cannot point to legislation that
authorizes a subcontractor to challenge the award of a government contract. See, e.g., Fort
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Howard Co. v. Department ofManagement Servs., 624 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. App. 1993)

(holding that a subcontractor lacks standing to challenge the award of a government contract
because a subcontractor does not fit within the Florida legislation authorizing such challenges);
. Treadon v. City of Oxford, 149 Ohio App. 3d 713, 714-715 (Ohio Ct. App., 2002) (subcontractor

has no standing because "[w ]ithout submitting a bid, appellant has no standing to challenge the
award of a contract on a public construction project"); Percy J. Matherne Contr. v. <Jrinnell Fire
Protection Sys. Co., 915 F.Supp. 818, 823 (E.O. La. 1995) (subcontractor has no standing

because he could not point to "authority [under the Public Bid Law] permitting a subcontractor
in the posture of this plaintiff to challenge the validity of the prime contract").

2.

The Idaho Code Allows Challenges to IDA Contract Awards Only Under
Limited Circumstances.

The Idaho Code sets forth a comprehensive statutory framework regulating contracts with
the IDA division of purchasing. See Idaho Code§ 67-5714, et. seq. The Idaho Code sets forth
rules regarding IDA contracts and creates a mechanism for challenging awards of IDA contracts.
Specifically, Idaho Code§ 67-5733 authorizes challenges only under specified and limited
circumstances. For example, Idaho Code§ 67-5733(l)(a) authorizes a vendor to challenge
specifications, but only ifthat challenge is made within ten working days after receipt of notice.
Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1)(c) provides that a "vendor whose bid is considered" may challenge the
award of an IDA contract "within five (5) working days following receipt of notice that he is not
the lowest responsible bidder." Syringa readily acknowledges these statutory provisions govern
challenges to IDA contract awards. See Syringa's Brief, p. 32 ("Syringa acknowledges that the
administrative appeal requirements ofldaho Code § 67-5733 apply to bid specification
challenges and to award challenges.").
'
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Without Idaho Code § 67-5733 or other authorizing legislation, neither bidders nor other
interested parties would have any right to challenge an IDA contract award. Idaho Code § 675733 creates such a right only with regard to certain parties and only upon compliance with
specific timing requirements. In other words, the statute creates a two-part test for determining
whether an individual or entity can challenge an IDA contract award: (!) Does the statute
authorize the challenge?; and (2) Did the challenger comply with the timing requirements for
bringing its challenge?
3.

Syringa Lacks Standing to Challenge the Amended SBPO's Because It Was
Merely a Potential Subcontractor and No Statute Authorizes Syringa's
Challenge

The IEN RFP contained the following limitation: "Bidders must also have a service
provider identification number from the Universal Service Fund discount program for
telecommunications services provided to the E-Rate eligible entities." R., Aff. of Mark Little,
disc 12, Exh. A (IEN RFP at§ 3.2). To receive E-Rate funding through the Universal Service
Administrative Company ("USAC"), a service provider must be registered with USAC. Syringa
was not so registered and was not eligible to participate in E-Rate funding. R., p. 269; R., p.
1141 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order at 3). Accordingly, it was not eligible to bid.
The cover letter to the IEN Alliance Proposal made clear that Syringa was not the bidder by
providing as follows: "For the purpose of executing a contract, ENA will be the contracting
entity for the project with Syringa as the principal partner and prime supplier." R., p. 169. The
IEN RFP required a bidder to submit a signed signature page on an IDA supplied form. The
signature page for the IEN Alliance bid proposal was signed by David M. Pierce, President and
CEO of ENA, and was not signed by Syringa. R., p. 467 The signature page identifies the
bidder/offeror as "Education Networks of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC." Id.
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. Syringa readily acknowledges that it was not a "vendor whose bid is e-0nsidered." See
Syringa's Brief, p. 32. Instead, Syringa admits that it was a "subcontractor[] who did not submit
a bid." Id. This admission is fatal to Syringa's standing. As explained above, Idaho Code§ 675733 authorizes challenges only by specified parties under limited circumstances, including (I)
specifitation challenges by vendors and (2) award challenges by a "vendor whose bid is
considered." Syringa contends that it was neither. See Syringa's Brief, p. 34 (asserting that
"Idaho Code§ 5733(c) ... does not apply to Syringa because Syringa was not 'a vendor whose
bid is considered."'); see also Syringa's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 20
("Syringa's claims do not involve a bid protest brought by a disappointed bidder or a challenge
to the specifications of the RFP"). Moreover, the IDA never treated Syringa as a bidder.
If Syringa is not challenging the SBPO under Idaho Code § 67-5733, it must point to

some other authority that grants it standing to bring its challenge. See Shook Heavy & Envtl.

Constr. Group v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. 1994) (explaining that, where the
Indiana Public Purchasing Statute provides for challenges to contract awards only under two
circumstances, a disappointed bidder who does not fit within one of those two circumstances
lacks standing to challenge the award because the "legislature has not provided any statutory
basis" for such a challenge). Syringa has not and cannot point to any such authority.
Accordingly, Syringa has no standing to bring its Declaratory Judgment Act claims against IDA.
Finally, it should be noted that Syringa argued before the District Court that the Teaming
Agreement between Syringa and ENA gave Syringa standing to challenge the SBPO. Even if
enforceable, the Teaming Agreement would do no more than make Syringa a subcontractor. As
explained above, '!subcontractor has no standing to challenge the award of an IDA contract. In
any event, as the District Court correctly concluded, the Teaming Agreement is unenforceable.
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R., pp. 2593 - 2596. Thus, Syringa cannot show that it has an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood that relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.
Syringa asserts at page 45 of its briefthat "ENA had the right and ability to say 'no' to
the amended SBPO offered to it" and that "ENA could and should have asserted that DOA could
not do so under Idaho Code § 67-571 S(A)." The fact that ENA may have had standing to
challenge the SBPO does not mean that Syringa, as a subcontractor, has standing. See Fort
Howard Co. v. Dept. ofManagement Servs., 624 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. App. 1993) (explaining
that a subcontractor has no standing to challenge the award of a government contract, especially
where the potential prime contractor who submitted the bid did not challenge the award).
In summary, Syringa lacks standing to challenge the SBPO. Accordingly, Syringa's
Second and Third causes of action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Counts 2 And 3 Of The Complaint For
Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Syringa is caught in a catch-22. Syringa must first establish that it has standing to

challenge the awards. To have such standing, Syringa must show that Idaho Code§ 675733(l)(c) authorizes its challenge, which requires a showing that Syringa was a "vendor whose
bid is considered." Syringa, however, disclaims the applicability ofl.C. § 67-5733(1)(c). This
statute requires that a challenge be brought within five working days, and Syringa did not
comply with that requirement. As the District Court concluded, and as discussed in detail below,
Syringa's failure to bring its challenge within five working days constitutes a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. R., p. 1156 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order).
Syringa cannot have it both ways. In order to challenge the bid award, Syringa must
establish that it fits within the statute granting limited rights of challenge. If it has a right to
challenge under the statute, it must then exhaust its administrative remedies in bringing its
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challenge. See Sabre Constr. Corp. v. County ofFairfax, 256 Va 68, 69-71(Va.1998) ("TI1e
Public Procurement Act not only creates the substantive right to file an action against a county,
but also imposes a special limitation on that right, namely appealing the written decision of the
public body within ten days. When a special limitation is part of the statute creating the
substantive right, the limitation is not merely a procedural requirement, but a part of the newly
created substantive cause of action.").
Syringa's contradictory positions would render meaningless Idaho Code § 67-5733's
standing limitations and exhaustion requirements. Under Syringa's argument, a subcontractor
with no right to challenge under Idaho Code § 67-5733 would have challenge rights than parties
given a statutory right of challenge because they would not be required to comply with the
statute's exhaustion requirements before filing a judicial action.
Syringa cannot question that the Legislation for the Idaho Education Network is also
contained in Title 67, Chapter 57. Even if standing is somehow confcned upon Syringa then
Syringa was a part of the same administrative process as Qwest, ENA and Ve1izon and
necessarily must be held to the same process for administrative appeals and judicial review as
provided in Title 67, Chapter 52 and Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code.
"As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the
court to challenge the validity of administrative acts." Lochsa Falls, LLC v. Stale of Idaho,
147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (quoting KMST, UC v. County of Ada,
138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003)).

The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA")

requires an exhaustion of the "full gamut" of administrative remedies before judicial review may
be sought. Id.; I.C. § 67-5271 (citations omitted). "[IJmportant policy considerations underlie
the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the opportunity for

- 16 OJ l52.0l05.49l9001.2

mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention, deferring to the administrative processes
established by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasijudicial functions of the administrative body." Blanton v. Canyon County, 144 Idaho 718, 721,
170 P.3d 383, 836 (2007) (quoting White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396,
401-02, 80 P.3d 332, 337-38 (2003)). Consistent with these principals, courts infer that statutory
administrative remedies implemented by the legislature are intended to be exclusive. Lochsa

Falls, supra, 147 Idaho at239; Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576; 579, 149 P.3d 851, 853-854
(2006) (quoting Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d 615, 618 (2004),
internal citations omitted); see also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Dep 't, 148 Idaho 378,
223 P. 3d 761 (2010) (the reviewing court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA does not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented, and
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous .... In other words, the
agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the dete1minations are supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record (citation omitted)).
The factual record is undisputed that Syringa did not exhaust the administrative remedies
called for under I.C. § 67-5733 to present a challenge to the multiple award specifications in the
RFP and IDA' s award to Qwest and to ENA. R., p. 745 (Affidavit of Bill Burns at~~ 10-11 ); R.
at 733-34 (Affidavit of J. Michael Gwartney

at~~

3-9); R. at 1155 (Substitute Memorandum

Decision and Order). Syringa concedes, as the District Court properly stated, that the
administrative appeal requirements of I.C. § 67-5733 apply to actions of the Division of
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Purchasing as to bid specifications! challenges and to award2 challenges. Syringa's Brief at 32;
R., pp. 1154-55.

:!:

LC. § 67-5733(l)(a) provides that: "There shall be, beginning with the day of receipt of
notice, a period of not more than ten (IO) working days in which any vender, qualified and
able to sell or supply to items to be acquired, may notify in writing the Administrator of the
Division of Purchasing of his intention to challenge the specifications and shall specifically
state the exact nature of his challenge. A specific challenge shall describe the location of the
challenged portion or clause in the specification document, unless a challenge concerns an
omission, explain why any provision should be struck, added or altered, and contain
suggested corrections.
Upon receipt of the challenge, the Administrator of the Division of Purchasing shall either
deny the challenge, and such denial shall be considered the final agency decision, or he shall
present the matter to the Director of the Department of Administration for appointment of a
determination's officer. If the Director of the Department of Administration appoints the
determination's officer, then all vendors, who arc invited to bid on the property sought to be
acquired, shall be notified of the appeal and the appointment of determination's officer and
may indicate in writing their agreement or disagreement with the challenge within five (5)
days. The notice to the vendors may be electronic. Any vendor may note his agreement or
disagreement with the challenge. The determination's officer may, on his own, motion,
·refer the challenge p011ion and any related portions of the challenge to the author of the
specifications to be rewritten with the advice and comments of the vendor's capable of
supplying the property; rewrite the specification himself and/or reject all or any part of any
challenge. If specifications arc to be rewritten, the matter shall be continued until the
determination's officer makes a final detenuination of the acceptability of the revised
specifications.
The Administrator shall reset the bid openirig no later than fifteen (15) days after final
determination of challenges or the amendment of the specifications. If the Administrator
denies the challenge, then the bid opening date shall not be reset.
The final decision of the detenuination's officer or Administrator on the challenge to
specifications shall not be considered a contested case within the meaning of the
Administrate Procedure Act; provided that a vendor disagreeing with specifications may
include such disagreement as a reason for asking for appointment of a determination's
officer pursuant to Section§ 67-5733(l)(c) Idaho Code."

2

"Idaho Code§ 67-5733(l)(c) provides that: A vendor whose bid is considered may, within
five (5) working days following receipt of notice that he is not the lowest responsible bidder,
apply to the Director of the Department of Administration for appointment of a
determination's officer. The application shall set forth in specific terms the reasons why the
Administrator's decision is thought to be erroneous. Upon receipt of the application, the
Director shall within three (3) working days:
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Contrary to Syringa's contention, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before
. resorting to the Court to challenge the validity of administrative acts. See Lochsa Falls, LLC v.
State of Idaho, 147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has
made it clear that the AP A requires an exhaustion of the "full gamut" of administrative remedies
. before judicial review may be sought. Id.; LC. § 67-5271. Syringa would have this Court ignore
this well-established stare dee/sis and the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 67, of the Idaho Code,
based upon the argument that its declaratory relief claims are not subject to I.C. § 67-5733
because: (I) Syringa was not a vendor whose bid is considered; and (2) Idaho Code § 67-5733
provides no post-contract administrative remedy. Syringa's B1ief at 32. Syringa's argument is

(i) Deny the application, and such denial should be considered the final agency decision; or
(ii) Appoint a dete1mination's officer to review the record to determine whether the
Administrator's selection of the lowest responsible bidder is conect; or
(iii) Appoint a determination's officer with authority to conduct a contested case hearing in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code.
A determination's officer appointed pursuant to Section 67-5733(1)(c)(ii), Idaho Code, shall
inform the Director by written recommendation whether, in his opinion, Administrator
selection of the lowest responsible bidder is conect. The detem1ination's officer in making
this recommendation may rely on the documents of record, statements of employees of the
State of Idaho participating in any phase of the selection process, and statements of any
vendor submitting a bid. A contested case hearing shall not be allowed and the
determination's officer shall not be required to solicit statements from any person. Upon
receipt of the recommendation from the determination's officer, the Director shall sustain,
modify or reverse the decision of the Administrator on the selection of the lowest
responsible bidder or the Director may appoint a detennination's officer pursuant to Section
67-5733(1 )( c)(iii), Idaho Code.
A determination's officer appointed pursuant to Section 67-5733(l)(c)(iii), Idaho Code,
shall conduct a contested case hearing and upon conclusion of the hearing shall prepare
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended order for the Director of the
Department of Administration, Upon receipt of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommended order, the Director shall enter a final order sustaining, modifying or reversing
the decision of the Administrator on the selection of the lowest responsible bidder."
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untenable and runs contrary to the important policy considerations underlying the requirement
for exhausting administrative remedies. Blanton, supra, 144 Idaho at 721.
It is disingenuous for Syringa to argue that it was not a vendor subject to the

administrative appeal requirements of Idaho Code § 67-5733(1)(a).

Idaho Code § 67-5716

defines. a "vendor" as "a person or entity capable of supplying property to the state." On
December 29, 2008, IDA, the office of Chief Information Officer ("OCIO"), hosted an RJlP
Vendor Conference to solicit questions and input in response to the RFP. R., p. 726 (Affidavit of
Mark Little at

if 6). The IEN Bidder's Conference Q&A Follow-up (the "Follow-up") provides

that, "NOTE: The last day for filing a specification appeal is January 9, 2009." Id. at 727. The
Follow-up also notes the questions and answers, and in relevant part provides: "Q-5. Is this a
single or multiple award contract? A-5. It is a multiple award contract." Id
On December 29, 2008, as a vendor Syringa attended, and is listed as an attendee, the
"IEN Bidder's Conference." R., Affidavit of Mark Little, disc. 12, Exh. D at 5-7. Greg Lowe
testified that Syringa was an intended vendor of the IEN in his affidavit as follows:
8.

I concluded, based on my review of the IEN RJlP, that the
Idaho Education Network presented an ideal opportunity
for Syringa to, in conjunction with an appropriate EEducational
Services
Provider, provide hi-speed
connectivity to Idaho schools, libraries and institutions. I
felt that Syringa was especially well qualified to provide
this backbone because I believed Syringa's fiber network
provided the most cost effective broadband service
available in significant parts of the state.

9.

Section 3.2 of the IEN RJlP asked for a "total end-to-end
service support solution."

10.

Section 3.2 of the IEN RFP also encouraged "teaming" the
potential contractors as follows:

Within the context of this RFP, the State is asking
potential industry partners to describe a business model that
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will initiate to senice the State of Idaho IEN Network. As
stated above, the State is looking for an industry partner or partners
who will take the initiative in areas of network design, network
management to include operations, maintenance and accounting
processes, It should be noted that highest consideration will be
given to the partner or partners presenting the best and most cost
effective "total end-to-end service support solution" and
supporting network architecture, which is also Complaint with the
specifications of this RFP.

12.

Syringa and Education Networks of America, Inc.
combined, in response to recommendation in Section 3 .2 of
the IEN RFP quoted above, for the purpose of preparing a
response to the IEN RFP and to provide the "total end-tocnd service support solution" solution the RFP requested.

13.

Syringa and Education Networks of America, Inc. and its
wholly owned subsidiary ENA Services, LLC (collectively
"ENA") entered into a Teaming Agreement for the purpose
of responding to the IEN RFP and to establish who "ENA
or Syringa" would be responsible for the provision of each
of the services requested by the RFP in the event our
proposal was accepted.

R., pp. 567-69 (Affidavit of Greg Lowe) (emphasis in original). As further testified to by Greg
Lowe, and specifically stated in the IEN Alliance Proposal to the RFP, Syringa was proposed as
the "prime supplier" of connectivity services for the IEN. Id. at 569 (Affidavit of Greg Lowe at

ir 15).
Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint seek declaratory relief for the alleged violation of the
multiple award statute, LC.§ 67-5718(A), based upon the argument that the specifications of

RFP 02160 do not support the IDA's decision to make a multiple award of the contract. In the
RFP and its amendments, IDA announced its intention to make a multiple award. R., p. 1156
(Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order). As a vendor, under the administrative appeal
provisions of LC. § 67-5733(1)(a), Syringa had the right to challenge the multiple award
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specifications set f01th in the RFP and its amendments. Syringa did not assert its rights as a
vendor under I.C. § 67-5733(l)(a). Consequently, it waived its rights to challenge the multiple
award specifications. That was Syringa's sole avenue to challenge the multiple award
specifications. Id.; see Fieldturf, Inc. v. State Dep 't ofAdmin., Div. ofPublic Works, 140 Idaho
385, 94 P.3d 690 (2004) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies deemed fatal to right to
pursue judicial challenge); see Lochsa Falls, LLC, supra, 147 Idaho at 23 7.
Notably, in Syringa's brief, it has failed to make any argument as to why the District
Court erred in its decision to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 due to Syringa's failure to challenge the
multiple award specifications pursuant to LC.§ 67-5733(1)(a). See Syringa's Brief at 32-34.Q
Syringa's failure to challenge the specifications of the RFP under LC.§ 67-5733(1)(a) was fatal.
Syringa is now barred from its attempt to circumvent the requirements to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Syringa's sole argument presented on appeal is that LC. § 67-5733 (I)(c) is not applicable
because it was not a "vendor whose bid is ronsidered" and because LC. § 67-573 3 provides no
post-contract administrative remedy. Syringa's Brief at 32. In the Complaint, Syringa alleged
that it was a joint bidder with ENA in that, "Syringa and ENA jointly submitted a response to the
IEN RFP as the IEN alliance ("IEN Alliance Proposal"), R., p. 23, ~ 26. Syringa further alleged
that IDA did not reject the IEN Alliance Proposal as a non-responsive or a nonresponsible bid
and that on January 20, 2009, the Division of Purchasing issued a Letter of Intent to award the
RFP to both Qwest and the JEN Alliance. R., p. 24, ~ ~ 30-31. At the heart of Syringa's

Q Syringa's only argument presented to this Court is under l.C. § 67-5733(l)(c); R., pp. 1150,
1155 (fn 9), and 1156 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order).
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complaint is its allegation that, "Despite being evaluated by the impartial evaluation team
selected by DOA as the most technically proficient in every category and the lowest cost b.idder
for the E-Rate portion of the IEN RFP, the DOA ·issued a multiple award of the IEN RFP to both
Qwest and the IEN Alliance." R., p. 25, ~ 35. By the admission of Syringa's own pleading,
Syringa was notified and had knowledge that IDA issued a multiple award to Qwest and ENA - which Syringa refers to as the IEN Alliance.1
At the time of the issuance of the Letter oflntent to Award dated January 20, 2009,
Syringa had notification that Syringa and/or the IEN Alliance was not the lowest responsible
bidder, and it should have challenged that decision under I.C. § 67-5733(1)(c). R., p. 1156. IDA
should then have had the opportunity to consider Syringa's challenge as part of the bid process.

Id. Once again, Syringa' s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies is an absolute bar to
pursue any judicial challenge. See Fie/dturf, supra, 140 Idaho at 385; James v. Dep 't of
Transportation, 125 Idaho 892, 895, 876 P.2d 590, 593 (1994) (breach of contract claim barred

due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
Additionally, Syringa alleged in its breach of contract claim that it and ENA jointly
submitted the IEN Alliance Proposal in reliance on ID A's solicitation for bids and the
representations contained in the IEN RFP, and that on January 20, 2009, IDA accepted the IEN
Alliance Proposal. R., p. 28, ~ ~ 56-57. Syringa also alleged that, "The IEN RFP, IEN Alliance
Proposal and the DOA's acceptance of the IEN Alliance Proposal created a contractual
obligation by all parties involved in the transactions to follow the process and criteria contained

1 Paragraph 33 of the complaint alleges that, "The Letter of Intent to Award indicates that the
IEN Alliance Proposal - listed by DOA as 'ENA' below - prevailed over Qwest and Verizon
in every single technical evaluation category and overall cost .... " R., p. 24, ~ 33.
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in the IEN RFP." Id. at 'If 58. Now, contrary to the allegations in the Complaint that IDA
accepted Syringa's bid as a part of the IEN Alliance Proposal, Syringa takes the opposite
position and argues to this Court that it was not a vendor whose bid is considered.
In essence, Syringa is arguing that the appeal provisions of LC. § 67-5733(1)(c) are
applicable to ENA but not to Syringa. This Cou1t should reject Syringa' s argument which runs
afoul of the prior positions taken by Syringa in this case. Syringa alleged that it was
participating in the IEN administrative bid process which resulted in the issuance of a multiple
award that it disagreed with. Therefore, to assert an administrative challenge and preserve a
right to judicial review, Syringa's compliance with the provisions of LC. § 67-5733(1)(c) was
mandatory.
Fmthermore, Syringa's argument that it was not "a vendor whose bid is considered"
places it in a "mousetrap." For instance, if Syringa was not a bidder, then it would only have a
right as a vendor to administratively challenge the specifications of the RFP, and nothing more.
Under Syringa's new argument, only ENA as the "vendor whose bid is considered" had a right to
assert a challenge under LC.§ 67-5733(l)(c). This is highlighted in Syringa's Brief wherein it
stated, "When ENA learned, after the issuance of the first SBPO, that the DOA was intending to
replace Syringa with Qwest as ENA's connectivity provider, ENA could and should have
asserted that DOA could not do so· under J.C.§ 67-5718(A}." See Syringa's Brief, pp. 45-46
(emphasis added). Therefore, under Syringa's theory, because ENA did not assert any challenge
under LC. § 67-5733(1)(c), any further action for administrative appeal and subsequent judicial
review was lost.
Consequently, Syringa only had standing to complain directly against ENA -- which it
did in Count 6 (breach of contract) of the Complaint for the alleged failure of ENA to perform its
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obligations to Syringa under the Teaming Agreement. R., p. 35. Syringa's complaint against
ENA was outside of the realm of the AP A However, any and all challenges to the specifications
or awards by IDA was within the province ofldaho Code§ 67-5733. Syringa's plight ended
when the District Court properly entered s1.lmmary judgment on Count 6 of the complaint. R., p.
2597.
Syringa's secondary argument that the District Court erred because LC.§ 67-5733(l)(c)
provides no post-contract administrative remedy is a red herring and is irrelevant. As discussed
in detail above, Syringa's complaint against IDA stems from the legal argument that under the
specifications of the RFP it was illegal for IDA to make multiple awards pursuant to LC. § 675718(A). As a vendor, Syringa should have challenged those specifications pursuant to
LC. § 67-5733(1)(a). Syringa failed to do so, and its arguments about the awards is surplusage.
The same analysis applies to reject Syringa's attempt to excuse its failure to challenge the
award under LC.§ 67-5733(l)(c). IfSyringa was not a vendor whose bid was considered under
the submission of the IEN Alliance's joint proposal, then Syringa had no standing to assert a
challenge, and that right to challenge was otherwise forfeited due to ENA's failure to challenge
the award under LC. § 67-5733(1)(c). Syringa is caught in an unavoidable "Catch 22" situation
under its multiple inconsistent attempts to argue away its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Comt's entry of summary judgment
on Counts 2 and 3 due to Syringa's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.
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l>. ·

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Against Syringa On
Count 4 Of The Complaint.
1.

This Court Should Affirm the l>istrict Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
on Count 4 as a Matter of Law because Syringa's Complaint is Void of any
Allegations Against Gwartney and Zickau that would Raise the Exceptions to
Governmental Liability (1.C. § 6-904).

In its Decision and Order granting Gwartney's and Zickau's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Count 4 (Tortious Interference with Contract), the District Court did not address the
assertion that the Complaint's allegations relating to tortious interference are fatally defective
because there are no allegations that Gwartney or Zickau were acting outside the scope of their
employment or that they acted with malice or with criminal intent. The District Court concluded
that such an analysis was unnecessary because of its conclusion that Gwartney and Zickau are
immune. Although Gwartney and Zickau concur with the District Court's conclusion that they
are immune under application of I. C. § 6-904(3 ), they submit that this Court should affirm the
entry of summary judgment because the allegations in Count 4 are deficient as a matter of law
and do not assert a viable cause of action for tortious interference with contract against them.
In asserting the claim oftortious interference with contract against Gwartney and Zickau,
Syringa seemingly was unaware of Idaho Code § 6-904 (Exceptions to Governmental Liability)
which provides, in relevant part, that:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the
course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ...
3.

Arises out of ... , or interference with contract rights.

I.C. § 6-904(3). "There is a 'rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee
within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his
employment and without malice or criminal intent."' Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 519
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50 P.3d 1004, 1014 (2002) (quoting LC.§ 6-903(e)). In light of this presumption, a plaintiffs
burden of showing malice, criminal intent, or action outside the course and scope of employment
is "particularly high." Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 784, 215 PJd
494, 504 (2009).
The term "criminal intent," as used in § 6-904(3), means "the intentional commission of a
. wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was
intended." Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187-188, 731P.2d171, 182-183
(1986). "Malice" means "actual malice," which is defined as "the intentional commission ofa
wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not
injury was intended." Id. Malice is thus criminal intent plus ill will: both malice and criminal
intent require an "intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal
justification or excuse"; malice adds to that the element of ill will.
An employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if "it is of the kind which he is
employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." Id. (emphasis in original). If the
employee's conduct "may be regarded as methods ... of carrying out the objectives of
employment," it is within the course and scope of employment, even if the methods are "quite
improper." Id. (quoting The Richard J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc.,
133 Idaho 180, 184, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (2000)). In other words, establishing that an employee's
acts were outside the course and scope of employment requires more than showing that the acts
"were carried out improperly." Id. (holding that the evidence showed that alleged acts of
defamation by state employee were within the scope and course of employment, "even though
the record indicates they were carried out improperly"). It is only where the employee acts for
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"purely personal motives ... in no way connected with the employer's interest" that he acts
outside the course and scope of his employment. Boise Tower Associates, 147 Idaho at 784, 215
P .3d at 504 (emphasis added).
Syringa's Complaint, however, makes no allegation that any of the complained-of
conduct occurred outside the course and scope of employment. Nowhere in the Complaint is
there any allegation of malice or criminal intent on the part of Gwartney and Zickau. Indeed,
Count Four alleges acts of Gwartney and Zickau that were committed "within the time and at the
place 9f [their] employment" with IDA, thus triggering the statutory presumption against malice,
criminal intent, or conduct outside the course and scope of employment. R., pp. 17-18
(Complaint, 'lj'lj 97 - 104).
In particular, the Complaint alleges that the following actions by Gwartney and Zickau
constituted interference with the Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa:
1.

Gwartney and Zickau "knew of the existence of the Teaming Agreement between

ENA and Syringa."
2.

Gwartney and Zickau "knew that should the IEN Alliance be awarded the IEN

Purchase Order, Syringa would implement the IEN technical network services, local access
connections, and backbone services."
3.

Gwartney and Zickau "instructed ENA to work only with Qwest during the IEN

implementation despite knowledge of the Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa."

Id at 'lj'lj 97-99, 101.
Paragraph 100 of the Complaint also alleges certain other conduct of Gwartney and.
Zickau, but such alleged conduct is wholly irrelevant to Syringa's claim under Count Four. In
Paragraph 100, Syringa alleges that IDA, Gwartney, and/or Zickau "have intentionally
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capriciously, and without authority, informed and directed agencies and political subdivisions
such as the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Idaho Department of Labor, and various
school districts not to use or contract with Syringa for telecommunications services." Even if
such allegations were true, however, they have nothing to do with the claim asserted in Count
Four, tortious interference with the alleged agreement between Syringa and ENA. Whether IDA,
Gwartney, or Zickau interfered with contracts between Syringa and "agencies and political
subdivisions" is simply not at all relevant to the inquiry as to whether they interfered with the
Teaming Agreement between Syringa and a private company, ENA, that is indisputably not an
agency or political subdivision. The allegations in Paragraph 100 are, therefore, irrelevant to the
underlying claim and should be disregarded in assessing whether Syringa has alleged conduct
upon which it could prevail on such claim.l!.
The allegations upon which Count Four is based are, therefore, that despite their
knowledge of the Teaming Agreement, Gwartney and Zickau instmcted ENA to work only with
Qwest during the implementation of the IEN. Because each of these allegations concerns
conduct at the time and place of Gwartney and Zickau's employment, the statutory presumption
against malice and criminal intent -- and in favor of conduct being within the scope of
employment -- applies. There is nothing in the Complaint ave1Ting -- or even suggesting -- that
any instruction to ENA occurred outside the course and scope of employment or was made with
malice or criminal intent. This is fatal to Count Four. See Myers v. Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168,
169-170, 559 P.2d 1136, 1137-38 (1977) (holding that claim of malicious prosecution was not

l!.

Even if the allegations in Paragraph 100 were considered as part of the claim for tortious
· illterference with contract, the result is the same: the Complaint alleges neither acts outside
the course and scope of employment nor acts of malice or criminal intent.
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sufficiently set forth by the language of the complaint because the complaint failed to allege that
defendant acted with malice; rejecting argument that malice could be inferred from the language
of the complaint). Syringa has simply "failed to plead clear facts in the [Complaint] to overcome
the statutory presumption that a government employee acts within the scope and course ofhis
employment while employed by the government and at the place of his employment." Johnson

v. N. Idaho College, 350 Fed. Appx. 110, 112 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Idaho law). As a result,
this Court should affirm the District Court's entry of summary judgment because Count 4 failed
to state a claim oftortious interference with contract against Gwartney and Zickau.

2.

The District Court Should be Affirmed because Syringa Failed to Present
Evidence of Conduct Implicating the Exceptions to Idaho Code§ 6-904(3).

In the alternative, the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Gwartney
and Zickau should be affirmed because Syringa failed to present evidence that Gwartney or
Zickau acted outside the course and scope of their employment, with malice, or with criminal
intent. See Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 519, 50P.3d1004, 1014 (2002). The
exception to tort liability in LC. § 6-904(3) shields Gwartney and Zickau from liability for
tcirtious interference with contract. See Rees v. State Dep 't ofHealth and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,
14, 137P.3d 397, 401 (2006).

a)

Under Idaho law, Gwartney and Zickau are presumed immune.

Under Idaho law, there is a presumption that "any act or omission of an employee within
the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment
and without malice or criminal intent." Anderson, supra, 137 Idaho at 519, 50 P.3d at 1014.
Therefore, Gwartney and Zickau are presumed immune from a claim of tortious interference

with contract. Syringa's burden of overcoming that presumption is "particularly high." Boise
Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504, (2009). Thus, "In
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order to survive summary judgment the plaintiff must create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the statutory presumption has been rebutted." Anderson, supra, 137 Idaho at 518, 50
P.3d at 1013. Syringa has the burden of demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the conduct of Gwruiney and/or Zickau
was within the course and scope of employment, without malice, and without criminal intent. In
other words, Syringa has the "particularly high" burden of producing evidence demonstrating
that Gwartney and Zickau (!) acted for "purely personal motives" that were "in no way
connected with the employer's interest," (Boise Tower Associates, LLC 147 Idaho at 784, 215
P .3d at 504; (2) intentionally committed a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or
excuse," Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho at 187-188, 731 P.2d at 182-83 (defining
criminal intent);

or (3) "intentionally committed a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal

justification or excuse and with ill will." Id. (defining malice).

b)

Syringa has failed to demonstrate on appeal that it presented evidence
in the record to overcome the statutory presumption of immunity.

In Syringa's brief, it generally argues that IDA's issuance of the two SBPOs to Qwest
and ENA and the subsequent amendment to the award violate LC. § 67-57 l 8(A) and that
Gwartney and Zickau are somehow attached to that wrongful or unlawful act. Syringa' s Brief at
51. Under Syringa's argument, whether the SBPOs allegedly violated LC. § 67-5718(A) is
irrelevant to its claim for tortious interference with contract against Gwruiney and Zickau
because Syringa has failed to overcome the presumption that Gwartney and Zickau acted within
the course and scope of their employment in connection with the Division of Purchasing's
issuance of multiple awards to Qwest and ENA. Notably, Syringa's brief does not direct this
Court to any citations in the record which would demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the conduct of Gwruiney and
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Zickau was within the course and scope of employment, without malice, and without criminal
intent. See Syringa's Brief, pp. 52-53. Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), Syringa has failed its burden of
proof in order to preclude summary judgment. See Badellv. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765P.2d126
(1988).
Syringa makes a singular reference to the affidavit testimony of Greg Lowe that Mr.
Gwartney told him to keep his criticisms regarding the IEN to himself or "Syringa would never
get any of the IEN business." Syringa's Brief at 52; R., pp. 1124, 1168. Notably, this Court has
concluded that very similar allegations did not constitute malice. In Beco Const. Co. Inc. v. City

a/Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 P.2d 950 (1993), the plaintiff company's allegation of malice
rested on evidence that a city councilman had informed one of plaintiff's employees that "as long
as I am on the City Council, Doyle [the president ofBeco] won't do no more work forthe City."

Id., 124 Idaho at 864, 865 P.2d at 955. This Court concluded that, even ifthe city councilman
had made such a statement, it would be insufficient to demonstrate malice on his part absent. any
evidence that he had directed the city attorney to preclude work from flowing to Beco. Id.
Likewise is the case herein. Even if Gwartney had made the statement alleged by
Syringa, the record reflects no evidence that Gwartney followed through with his alleged threat.
Indeed, the statement allegedly uttered by Gwartney was conditional, unlike the unconditional
promise - that no work would flow to Doyle while he remained on the City Council - made by
the city councilman in Beco. Syringa's case is, therefore, significantly weaker than Beco's was.
Moreover, beyond having no evidence that Gwrutney followed through on his alleged threat by
preventing Syringa from getting any work on the IEN, Syringa also lacks evidence that any of
the conditions precedent to Gwartney acting on his alleged threat actually occurred -- i.e., that
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Mr. Lowe failed to keep his criticism to himself or that Gwartney was made aware of any
subsequent criticisms of IEN by Mr. Lowe.
Even applying any reasonable inferences from Syringa's skimpy references to the Record
in its favor, it is apparent that the complained-of conduct was within the course and scope of
employment and without criminal intent and malice. As a matter oflaw, Gwartney and Zickau
cannot be held liable for tortious inte1ference with contract -- in either their official or individual
capacities. See Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 427-428, 816 P.2d 982, 984-985 (1991)
(supervisor and president of state university could not be sued in their individual capacities
because plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption that defendants acted in the course and
scope of their employment); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 216, 796 P.2d 87, 93
(1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant because record contained "no
evidence that the defendants acted with the requisite malice or criminal intent to circumvent the
exceptions to liability contained in Idaho Code § 6-904(3)"); Morton v. Lunde, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44523 (D. Idaho June 19, 2007) (dismissing all claims because the record "is void of any
evidence that the Defendants were acting with malice or criminal intent").
Because the record here is similarly void of evidence that Gwaiiney or Zickau acted
outside the course and scope of their employment, acted with malice, or acted with criminal
intent, Syringa cannot "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to [its] case on which [it] bore the burden of proof." Pounds, 120 Idaho at 428, 816
P.2d at 985. Consequently, Count Four fails as a matter oflaw, and the District Court's entry of
summary judgment should be affirmed. R., pp. 2584-2587.
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E.

The State Respondents Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal
And Cross-Appeal.
The State Defendants request an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal and on cross~

appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40, I.A.R. 41, Idaho Code §§ 12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. The
basis for this award of attorney fees and the arguments that must be made in this briefin support
of such request are set forth below in Respondents' Cross-Appeal Brief, and are incorporated
herein as though fully set forth herein.

STATE DEFENDANTS' CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF
I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents IDA, Gwartney and Zickau incorporate by reference the factual background and
procedural posture set forth above, supplemented by the following:.2. Upon entry of the final judgment
in favor of the State Defendants, they sought an award of costs and attorney fees in the sum of
$348,052.88 pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121..!..Q. Plaintiff objected to the request for
fees on the ground that the State Defendants failed to make their claim in accordance with the

.2.

On November 28, 2011, the Supreme Court entered an Amended Order Granting Stipulation
To Augment Record, Lodge Exhibits And Extend Time For Filing Syringa's Brief
("Amended Order Nov. 28, 2011"), which augmented the record to include 23 documents
and certain Electronic Exhibits. On December 28, 2011, the Supreme Court entered an Order
Granting Motion To Augment The Record ("Order Dec. 28, 2011"), which augmented the
record to include the Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees,
Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, and Amended Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney
Fees. Copies of these Orders are attached marked Appendix 1 and 2 respectively. Copies of
the Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, Judgment Re: Costs
And Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney Fees are attached
marked Attachments 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Reference to these documents described in the
Orders will be by the title of the document.
lQ 3/21111 State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Request for Costs and Attorney Fees.
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. requirements of Idaho Code § 12-117 .11 The State Defendants subsequently moved to amend their
claim for fees to add claims under Idaho Code § 12-117(1) 12 and filed a second amendment to assert a
claim for costs under Idaho Code§ 10-1210 ..Ll.
The District Court granted the motions to amend the claims for costs and fees.14 The District
Court concluded thatthe State Defendants were the prevailing party and, accordingly, awarded costs as
a matter ofright to the State Defendants.12 However, the District Court denied the State l)efendants'
claim for attorney fees.16
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

1.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the

exclusive means for awarding attorney fees in favor of state agencies.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to award attorney fees to the State

l)efendants pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
3.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to award attorney fees to the State

Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.

11 4/4/11 Plaintiffs' Objection to the State Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
12

.Ll.
H

12
. 16

Fees.
4/22/11 State Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees .
4/25/11 Second Motion For Leave To Amend Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees.
5/4/11 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees. Attached hereto
marked Appendix 3.
Id.
Id.
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4.

Whether the District Court ened in failing to award attorney fees to the State

Oefendants pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117(1).
5.

Whether the District Court e1Ted in finding that Syringa has standing.ll

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the Supreme Court] exercises free
review." Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 390, 247 P.3d 615, 617 (2010) (quoting
Doe v. Boy Scouts ofAm., 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)). "Determining the meaning of an

attorney-fee statute and whether it applies to the facts are issues oflaw that [the Supreme Court] freely
reviews." Id. (quoting Jr. Simplot Co. v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198
(1999)).

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred When it Concluded that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the
Exclusive Means for Awarding Attomey Fees to (as Opposed to Against) State
Agencies.
1.

The Legislative Intent for Awarding Attorney Fees that is Clearly Stated in
Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121 Should be Followed by the
Court.

This Court has stated that "[iJn order for attorney fees to be awarded pursuant to a statute,
the statute must clearly contemplate that particular remedy." Sanchez v. Stale ofIdaho, Dept. of
Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 243, 141 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2006)("[I]t is clear that the Idaho

ll Standing is a jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before the merits of the case. Young,
137 Idaho at 104-105. Accordingly, it is addressed at the beginning of this brief as both an
issue on cross-appeal and as an alternative basis for affirming the District Court's dismissal
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Legislature has provided for the award of attorney fees specifically when it so intends, and only
when it so intends.")). Thus, when the Legislature has clearly, by the plain language of a statute,
provided for the award of attorney fees, the legislative intent should not be thwarted by !he
courts .
. Further, with respect to statut01y consuuction, as stated by this Court in State v, Schulz:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the
intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory
interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be
considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. \Vhen the
statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of
the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not
consider rules of statutory construction.
264 P .3d 970, 974 (Idaho 2011) (internal citations omitted).

2.

Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) is Not Intended to be the E:xclusive Authority for
Awarding Attorney Fees in Favor of State Agencies.

Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) and (4), as amended in 2010, provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
12-117. ATTORi'IEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND
EXPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTA,'ICES. (1) Unless
otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency
or political subdivision and a person, the state agency or political
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevai!ing party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
+* *

of Syringa's Second and Third causes of action.
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(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, corporation,
association or any other private organization;
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county or any
taxing district.
(c) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 675201, Idaho Code.

I. C. § 12-117(1), (4) (2010) (emphasis added).
Idaho Code§ 67-5201 defines "Agency" to mean each state board, commission,
department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does
not include the legislative or judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of
the constitution of the state ofldaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively
from the constitution, the state militia or the state board of correction. I.C. § 67-5201 (2010). The
Idaho Department of Administration (IDA) is clearly a state "agency" within the scope ofldaho
Code §12-117(1).
As enacted in 1984, section 12-117(1) omitted the proviso, "Unless otherwise provided
by statute." I.C. § 12-117, as added by Idaho Session Laws 1984, ch. 204, sec. 1, p. 501. It
simply began with the language, "[i]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency and a person .... " Id. The Statement of Purpose to RS 10473 for
H.B. No. 696, which enacted section 12-117 and is found in the Minutes of the State Affairs
Committee in the House of Representatives, states that "[t]he purpose of this legislation is to
provide for the award of costs to a person who is involved in an administrative or judicial
proceeding where a state agency is the adverse party, and the court finds that the state agency
acted without any reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho H. State Affairs Comm. Minutes (47th
Leg. 2nd Reg. Sess.) (March 12, 1984). Clearly, the purpose of the new statute is to provide for
an award of costs against (as opposed to in favor of) state agencies.
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In 2000, section 12-117(1) was amended to provide:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a
city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against
whorri the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
Idaho Session Laws 2000, ch. 241, sec. 1, p. 675. The Statement of Purpose to RS 09456 for S.B.

1333, which became section 12-117(1), states:
Idaho law presently allows for the recovery of attorney fees against
public agencies in cases where the public agency frivolously
pursues or defends the administrative action or civil judicial
proceeding. There is no general provision for an award of attorney
fees in favor of the public agency where the other party to the
action frivolously pursues or defends the administrative or civil
action. This legislation amends Idaho Code § 12-117 to provide
that attorney fees may be awarded to state agencies as well as to
other public entities where the public entity is the prevailing party
and where the party against whom the judgment is rendered as
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Senate Judiciary and Rules Comm. Minutes (55th Leg. 2nd Reg. Sess.) (January 28, 2000).
Nothing in section 12-117(1) provides that this section is the exclusive authority for awarding
attorney fees in favor of state agencies.
Section 12-117 was amended in 20 I 0 and in 2012, but the amendments do not affect the
issue now before the Court in this appeal. See Idaho Session Laws 2010, ch. 29, sec. I, p. 49;
Senate Bill No. 1332 (61st Leg. 2nd Reg. Session) (2012).

3.

The District Court Misconstrued I. C. § 12-117.

In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees at p. 20, the
District Court recognized that, under the plain language ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3) and§ 12121, it would appear that the State Defendants may seek attorneys' fees pursuant to these

- 39 01152.0105.4939001.2

statutes. Nevertheless, based upon the language in prior Supreme Court decisions that Idaho
Code§ 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees in favor of state agencies, the
l)istrict Court denied the requests for attorney fees. Specifically, the District Court stated:
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in, among other things, an action to recover on a
contract related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise or services, or an action to recover in a commercial
transaction. Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The statute defines "party" to
mean "any person, pa1tnership, corporation, association, private
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof." Id
Thus, under the plain language of the statue it would appear that
· the State Defendants may seek attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(3) and/or 12-121.
Several Idaho Supreme Court cases, however, state that Idaho
Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees
for state agencies. E.g. Potlatch, 148 Idaho at 635; Wes/way
Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't., 139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d
721, 730 (2003); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130
Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997). In Potlatch, the court
denied a school district's request for attorneys' fees against a
school district brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. Id
Similarly, the comt in Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150
Idaho 388, _ , 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010) followed Potlatch and
denied an individual's request for fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§
12-120(3) and 12-121 against a county. See also Brown v. City of
Pocatello, 148 Idal10 802, 811-12, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010)
(restating Potlatch's holding that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the
exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for entities to which it
applies).
Despite its conclusion that this case is rooted in a commercial
transaction, the Comt is constrained to follow the Supreme Court's
decisions in the above cases and will decline to consider a request
for attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) or 12-121.
Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney
fees for state agencies.
3/4/11 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees-Page 20.
4.

Potlatch Does not Establish that State Agencies are Precluded from Seeking
an Award of Attorney Fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) or 12-121.
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In Potlatch Educ. Ass'n & Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d
1277, 1282 (2010), this Court stated, "LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney
fees. for the entities to which it applies." This statement was dicta (as unnecessarily broad) and
"should not be considered as having altered or overruled sub silentio the rule established by the
Court's earlier decision[s]." State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 388-89, 195 P.3d 745, 747-748 (Ct.
App. 2008). Even if not dicta, it was manifestly wrong (for all the reasons stated below) and
should be corrected. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 37 (Idaho January 27,
2012) ("Where a holding establishing precedent on a question oflaw is manifestly wrong, we
should correct it."). Moreover, it is (!) unsupported by reasoning, analysis, or authority; (2)
contrary to the express terms of Section 12-120(3); (3) contrary to the acknowledged purpose of
the definition of parties in Section 12-120(3); (4) contrary to the express terms of section 12-117
("notwithstanding any other statute ... "); (5) contrary to prior authority (numerous pre-Potlatch
cases in which the Court either awarded attorney fees under sections 12-120 or 12-121 or
evaluated whether fees were warranted under those sections); and (6) unsupported by subsequent
cases (several times the post-Potlatch Court has awarded fees pursuant to Sections 12-120 or 12121 (or at least considered and evaluated the issue)). Although several cases have followed/cited
Potlatch for the exclusivity of section 12-117, none has supported it with reasoning or analysis,

and none has addressed the conflict with the statutory language.
In Potlatch, the Court stated that "LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding
attorney fees for the entities to which it applies." Id. Although this statement superficially
supports the District Court's conclusion, upon closer scrutiny the statement cannot justify the
conclusion of the District Court, for several reasons.
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First, at issue in Potlatch was a request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121, not
§ 12-120(3 ). As a result, the Potlatch court did not address any claim under § 12-120(3), and it

is therefore unclear whether the Potlatch court even intended its proclamation to apply to claims
for attorney fees by state agencies under§ 12-120(3). If the court did so intend, the statement is
merely dicta insofar as it applies to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Second, the cases on which the Potlatch court relies, Wes/way Const., Inc. v. Idaho
Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003), and State v. Hagerman Water Right
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997), each held only that§ 12-117 is the
exclusive basis for seeking attorney fees against a state agency. They did not address the issue
whether § 12-11 7 is the exclusive basis for an award of attorney fees in favor of a state agency.
Potlatch would thus impose a limitation upon the ability ofa state agency to seek attorney fees
that was previously unknown in Idaho. Moreover, it did so without explanation or analysis, and
by merely relying on case law that was inapplicable to the issue of attorney fee claims fil'. a state
agency. As a result, the statement in Potlatch is not just dicta, it is unreasoned, unsupported
dicta that would create new law.
Third, to the extent that Potlatch is intended to apply to Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), it is
contrary not only to the express terms of that statute but to the many cases applying that statute
to claims for attorney fees by state agencies or political subdivisions.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) expressly applies to situations in which a state agency such as
the IDA is a prevailing party in a civil action. That section provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law,
the prevailing lli!!!Y shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
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I. C. § 12-120(3) (2001) (emphasis added). The statute expressly defines "party":

The tern1 "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof.
Id. (Emphasis added.) Notably, the Legislature added the statutory definition of"party" in 1987
to "allow recovery of attorney fees by the state against a private party[.]" Department of Health
and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 192 n. 10, 742 P.2d 992, 998 (1987) (emphasis added).
It is clear that the Legislature intended § 12-120(3) to apply in the circumstances of this

case. There is no dispute that the facts herein fit \vithin § 12-120(3): it cannot be disputed that
IDA is a "political subdivision" of the state ofldaho, that IDA was the prevailing party below, or
that the gravamen of Syringa's lawsuit against IDA was a commercial transaction.lll. But the
Potlatch court does not even acknowledge, let alone address, such statutory language. The
court's unreasoned dicta would effectively write out of the statute the definition of "pa1ty" that
the Legislature expressly included within it and effectively nullify the Legislature's amendment
of the· statute with neither justification nor analysis.
The Idaho Supreme Court routinely awarded attorney fees to state agencies (including the
IDA) and political subdivisions pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121-- before
Potlatch. See, e.g., In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199

lJl. Notably, because Syringa sued IDA for breach of contract, there is an independent ground on
which § 12-120(3) applies, even though there was no contract between IDA and Syringa.
Beco Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P. 3d 844,
(2008); Blimka v.My Web Wholesaler, UC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007)
(quoting E.L Dupont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990)).
See also In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 P.3d
I 02, 119 (2008) (upholding grant of attorney fees to City of Boise's urban renewal agency
even though not a party to the contract, but because it was an integral party in the commercial
transaction).
·
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P.3d 102, 119 (2008) (upholding grant of attorney fees to City of Boise's urban renewal agency);
Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 670-671, 52 P.3d 307,
314-315 (2002) (upholding decision of District Court to grant attorney fees to IDA); Clarkv.
State, l)ept. of Health and Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 993 (2000) (awarding State
attorney fees on appeal); Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999)
(awarding attorney fees to state superintendent of schools). This Court has also granted attorney
fees to state agencies or political subdivisions pursuant to other subsections ofldaho Code § 12120. Scott BeckStead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 857, 216 P.3d
141,146 (2009) (holding that City was entitled to attorney fees under§ 12-120(1)).
Moreover, this Court has continued to award fees to state agencies pursuant to § l 2•
120(3) or§ 12-121 even after the Potlatch decision. Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway
Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 687, 249 PJd 868, 880 (2011) (awarding attorney fees to Hagerman
Highway District pursuant to § 12-121); Doe v. lda!w Dept. of Health & Welfare, 150 Idaho 491,
497, 248 P.3d 742, 748 (2011) (awarding attorney fees to the Department of Health and Welfare
pursuant to§ 12-121); Sadidv. Idaho State University, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (Idaho 2011)
(awarding attorney fees to state university under § 12-120(3)). See also Stoddart v. Pocatello
School Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 687, 239 P.3d 784, 792-93 (2010) (evaluating school district's
claim for attorney fees pursuant to§ 12-121 and rejecting claim on basis that plaintiff's appeal
was not frivolous).
These pre- and post-Potlatch decisions are consistent with the definition of"party" in

§ 12-120(3). They are also consistent with the terms of§ 12-117(1), which defers to § 12120(3). As discussed above, section 12-117(1) begins with the proviso, "Unless otherwise
provided by statute .... " There is no question that§ 12-120(3) is a statute that "ot11erwise
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provide(s]" for attorney fees. As a result, by its own terms,§ 12-117(1) cannot control where
§ 12-120(3) applies.

Notably, the Potlatch Court's quotation of§ 12-117 omits the language, "[u]nless
ot)lerwise provided by statute ...." The Court, purporting to quote§ 12-117( I), stated:
Section 117(1) provides:

[l]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as
adverse pruties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing
district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if
the court finds that the pruty against whom the judgrrient is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
148 Idaho at 635, 226 P.3d at 1282. The correct language of§ 12-117(1), as amended in 2000,
states:
Unless othenvise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a
city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
(Emphasis added.) Obviously, the omission of the qualifying language, which is a clear reference
to the other statutory provisions that authorize an award of attorney fees, including§§ 12-120(3)
and 12-121, changes the meaning of the statute and the legislative intent for the statute.

In Department of Health and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho I 86, 192 n. 10, 742 P.2d
992, 1987 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that§§ 12-120 and 12-121 were
amended in 1987 to allow recovery of attorney fees by the state against a private party under
certain circumstances.
The unnecessarily broad dicta in Potlatch cannot overcome the long line of cases
awarding attorney fees to state agencies or political subdivisions or the express language of
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Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1) and 12-120(3). The Potlatch Court did not "cite, discuss, or
distinguish" any of its earlier decisions, nor did it "overtly discount the greater weight of
authority and line of authority"; as a result, its dicta about the exclusivity ofldaho Code § 12-117
"should not be considered as having altered or overruled sub silentio the rule established by the
Court's earlier decision[s]." State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 388-89, 195 P.3d 745, 747-748 (Ct.
App. 2008). See Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 940-941, 703 P.2d 699, 704705 (1985) ("There was no call for the Court of Appeals to instead declare new law and overrule,

sub silentio, ... a long line of cases dating back over 80 years.").
Similarly, the Potlatch court did not cite, discuss, or distinguish Idaho Code§ 12-120(3),
let alone explain why the deferential language in§ 12-117(1) should not be given effect. Rather
than provide statutory interpretation or construction, the Court improperly rewrote those statutes

sub silentio. Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 246, 141P.3d1108,
1115 (2006) (Eismann, J ., concmTing) (Idaho Supreme Court "does not have the power to
rewrite [statutes]. Doing so is simply a blatant abuse of power and a violation of the separation of
powers."); Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Reg. Med Center, 138 Idaho 143,
146, 59 P.3d 314, 317 (2002) ("we do not have the authority to rewrjte the statute"); Bogner v.

State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Com'n, I 07 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d I 056,
I 058 (1984) (courts lack authority to rewrite a statute).

5.

Smith v. Washington Coun(vSnffers from the Same Infirmities as Potlatch.

Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010) quotes
Potlatch's proclamation about § 12-117 in support of its ruling that a private party seeking
judicial review of an agency decision could not seek attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
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For two reasons, the Washington County court's reiteration of Potlatch is even less convincing
than Potlatch.
First, Washington County Court's statement is twice dicta. The Court noted that although
the plaintiff had requested attorney fees under§ 12-120(3) in his brief, the plaintiff's attorney
"expressly waived any claim for fees under these provisions" at oral argument. Id. The
applicability of§ 12-120(3) was, therefore, not before the Court. Moreover, the Court had
already determined that a petition for judicial review was not a civil action because it was not
"c6mtnenced by the filing of a complaint with the court," but was, instead, fill "administrative
· judicial proceeding." Id. at 618. Because Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies, by its terms, only to a
"civil action," the Court had already effectively ruled that it was not applicable to a petition for
judicial review of an agency decision.
Second, the Washington County court relied on Potlatch and the cases cited by Potlatch
in support of its conclusion that§ 12-120(3) did not apply; For the reasons set forth above, those
cases do not support a conclusion that§ 12-120(3) is precluded by§ 12-117.12. Moreover, the

Washington County case involved only a request for attorney fees against the county. The Court
did not, therefore, hold that§ 12-120(3) is not applicable to attorney fee requests Qy_ a state
agency or political subdivision.
Importantly, like Potlatch, the Washington County court failed to address the express
statutory language of Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) or the numerous cases under which the Court had

12 The Washington County court also cited Johnson v. Blaine Cnty., 146 Idaho 916, 929, 204
P.3d 1127, 1140 (2009), in support of its conclusion, but the Blaine County court merely held
that fees for a petition for judicial review of a county's decision are not awardable under
Idaho Code§ 12-121.
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previously awarded attorney fees to state agencies and political subdivisions under that statute
and under§ 12-121. Nor did the Court rule -or even suggest-that the language of§ 12-120(3)
was unclear or ambiguous, that the statute was unconstitutional, or that the "unless otherwise
provided by statute ... " language of§ 12-117(1) meant something other than what it said. The
Comi did not acknowledge that its broad statement conflicted with numerous precedent, let alone
distinguish any of those cases. In short, the statement about the exclusivity ofldaho Code§ 12117 in Washington County is as infirm as the statement in Potlatch on which it relied-ifnot
more so.
For these same reasons, Sopatykv. Lemhi County, 264 P.3d 916, 925 (Idaho 2011) ("This
Court has already explicitly held that§ 12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking attorney's fees
against the entities to which it applies.") is inapplicable here. Whether§ 12-117 is the exclusive
provision for attorney fees in appeals of administrative decisions is not dispositive on the
question whether§ 12-120(3) applies in civil actions. Indeed, the Court's rationale for holding
that § 12-117 is the exclusive provision for attorney fees in appeals of administrative decisions is
expressly predicated on its conclusion that an appeal of an administrative decision is not a civil
action. While it makes sense to conclude that§ 12-120(3), which by its very terms applies to
civil actions, does not apply to cases that are not civil actions, it defies logic to extend that .
reasoning to civil actions. Moreover, in Sopatyk, the Comi correctly stated that the restriction in
§ 12-117 applies when the claim for attorney's fees is against state agencies, rather than in favor
of state agencies.
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B.

The IDA is Entitled to All Attorney Fees Expended in Defense of this Litigation
Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Section 12-120(3} provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and
in any commercial transaction unless othe1wise provided by law,
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that an award of attorney fees is mandatory in cases

arising out ofa commercial transaction. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292, 221 P3d 81, 91
(2009) ("The court must always award attorney fees to the prevailing party 'in commercial
transactions."'). An award of attorney fees is required where "the case involves a 'commercial
transaction' and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit." Bream v. Benscoter, 139
Idaho 364, 370, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003).
A ."commercial transaction" is defined as "all transactions except transactions for
personal or household purposes." LC.§ 12-120(3). "Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) does not require
that there be a contract between the parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires
that there be a commercial transaction." In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146
Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008). Moreover, this Court "has given a broad meaning to
the word 'transaction."' Id. "The commercial transaction ground in LC.§ 12-120(3) neither
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct ... nor does it
require that there be a contract." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152
P.3d 594, 599 (2007)). Here, the State Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees
because they are the prevailing parties and because a commercial transaction is the gravamen of
Plaintiffs claims.
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The crux of Plaintiffs complaint is that the IDA was contractually obligated to utilize
Plaintiff as specified in the IEN Alliance proposal. The first cause of action in Plaintiffs
Complaint is that the IDA breached a contract with Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
the December 2008 IEN RFP constitutes a solicitation for bid for telecommunication services
and equipment. R., pp. 27-28 (Complaint, f'if 52-53). Plaintiff alleges that it and ENA
submitted the IEN Alliance Proposal in reliance on the IDA's solicitation for bids. R., p. 28, at

· 11 56. Plaintiff further alleges that the IDA accepted the IEN Alliance Proposal and, thus,
"oreated a contractual obligation by all parties involved in the transactions to follow the process
and criteria contained in the R.FP." Id, at 'if1f 57-5 8. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the IDA
breached its contractual obligations by failing to adhere to the terms of the agreement, i.e., by
failing to utilize Plaintiff as specified in the IEN Alliance prnposal. Id. at

'if1f 59-60.

For purposes of an award of attorney foes under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), it does not
matter whether a contract did or did not exist between Plaintiff and the IDA. All that matters is
that Plaintiff alleged that it had a contract with the IDA in the nature of a commercial transaction.
"Where a party alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction under
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party
may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Lexington

Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d 526, 537 (2004).
The alleged contract was for telecommunication services and equipment, which is a
"commercial transaction" because it "was not for personal or household purposes." Univ. of

Idaho Found.. Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc., 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008)
(quoting LC.§ 12-120(3)). Accordingly, the gravamen of Plaintiffs breach of contract claim
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was a commercial transaction and an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is
mandatory.
All other claims against the State Defendants arose out of the same commercial
transaction. In Univ. ofIdaho Found., Inc., this Court explained that it gives "broad meaning to
the word 'transaction."' 146 Idaho at 541, 199 P.3d at 116. The Court held that multiple

'
contracts among different parties constitute one single "transaction" if the contracts related
to the
same purpose. Id., 146 Idaho at 544, 199 P.3d at 119 (holding that, "[a]lthough there were eight
contracts involving six separate entities, all of the above-mentioned contracts constituted one
transaction" because "[t]hey were all executed to achieve the Foundation's purpose of
transferring Unit 101 to the !SBA so that it would construct on Unit 101 the Water Center to be
used by the University ofldaho").
This case similarly involved multiple alleged agreements that constitute one single
"transaction." The Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa and the alleged contract
created by the IEN RFP and the IEN Alliance Proposal constitute a single commercial
transaction because each contract related to the provision of telecommunication services and
equipment to the IDA.
The fact that Plaintiffs Second and Third causes of action were for declaratory relief
does not take them outside ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3)'s provision for attorney fees. This Court
has held that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to declaratory judgment actions if the gravamen of
the action is a commercial transaction. In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146
Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008). Here, the gravamen of both claims for declaratory
relief is the same commercial transaction out of which the breach of contract claim arose.
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Counts Two and 'Three of Plaintiffs Complaint each alleged that the ID A's award of
work to Quest -- i.e., the contract to which Plaintiff claims it was entitled -- should be declared
void pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5725 because that agreement allegedly did not comply with
various statutory provisions. R., pp. 30, 33 (Complaint, ~~ 76, 94), The gravamen of each of
. these claims is the commercial transaction pursuant to which the IDA awarded work to Qwest
and pursuant to which Plaintiff contends it should have been awarded work.
Plaintiff's final claim against the State Defendants, Count Four, arises out of the same
commercial transaction. In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants tortiously
interfered with the Teaming Agreement entered into between Plaintiff and ENA. As the District
Court explained in its February 9, 2011 Memorandwn Decision And Order Re: Motions For
Summary Judgment (R., pp. 2555-2597), the basis for this claim was not initially clear. Id at p.

26.

However, it later became "clear that Syringa asserts that the multiple award to ENA and

Qwest is the basis, or part of the basis, for the tortious interference claim." Id. at 27, ~ 49.
("Upon information and belief, Gwartney and Zickau unduly influenced the IEN FRP award to
Qwest and unduly, unlawfully, and without authority, split and divided the IEN Alliance
Proposal to deprive Syringa of any of the IEN implementation work."). Thus, the gravamen of
Plaintiff's tortious interference claim was the commercial transaction to which Plaintiff contends
it was, or should have been, a party.
In swnmary, the State Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) because they prevailed on Plaintiff's claims, the gravamen of which is a
commercial transaction.
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C.

The IDA is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
1.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 Provides for an Award of Attorney Fees to the
Prevailing Party Where the Action was .Brought or Pursued Frivolously,
Unreasonably or Without Foundation.

Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party
if the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See J-U-B
Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. ofHartford, 146 Idaho 311, 318, 193 P.3d 858, 865 (2008).
Here, Plaintiff brought and pursued its claims unreasonably and without foundation because it
brought suit without standing to sue and without first exhausting its administrative remedies.
These doctrines are well established in Idaho law.
The unreasonableness of this action is further exemplified by Plaintiffs t01iious
interference claim, which was the only claim remaining after the Comi's July 23, 2010 Substitute
Memorandum Decision And Order. R., pp. 1139-1157. To prevail on that claim against
Defendants Gwaiiney or Zickau, Plaintiff was required to present admissible evidence that the
Defendants acted outside the course and scope of employment, with malice or with criminal
intent. R., pp. 2555-2597, 2582 (Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions For Summary
Judgment). Plaintiff had no such evidence. Despite the clear absence of evidence to support its
claim, Plaintiff filed an I.R.C.P. 56(f) motion in response to the State Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and insisted on taking an excessive number of depositions. As the District
Court recognized, Plaintiff took the depositions of "all, or very nearly all, of the individuals
involved in the bid solicitation and award process." R., p. 2584. Even after taking all of the
depositions, Plaintiff still had no admissible evidence to support its t01iious interference claim.
Bringing a cause of action without standing, failing to exhaust administrative remedies, and
pursuing a cause of action without a shred of evidence to support that cause of action fits
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squarely within Idaho Code § 12-121 's provision for an attorney foe award for an action brought
or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
I).

The IDA is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-117(1).
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides authority for an award of attorney fees to a state agency

when .the state agency is the prevailing party and the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. As described above in Section C. I. of this Cross-Brief, Plaintiff
lac.ked standing to bring this action against IDA and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Moreover, it pursued the tortious interference claim when it had no admissible evidence to
·support that claim. Bringing a cause of action without standing and without exhausting
administrative remedies, and pursing a cause of action without admissible evidence to support
the claim, fits squarely within Idaho Code § l 2-117(1) provision for an attorney fee award
brought without a basis in fact or law.

E.

The State Defendants' Request For Attorney Fees Is Reasonable Under The Rule
54(e)(3) Factors that Were Submitted to the District Court.
The "reasonableness" of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's consideration

of the factors in 1.R.C.P. 54(c)(3). Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp.,
139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P .3d 475 (2004). The factors of Rule 54(e)(3) include: time and labor;
difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or contingent fees; time limitations; amount
and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; costs
of automated research; and any other factors. Id. Attorney fees are a discretionary matter for the
trial court and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Although a trial court is
not required to make "specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors in Rule
54(~)(3),"

it is required to consider those factors when determining the amount of fees to award.

Id. The State Defendants complied with all requirements under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
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v.
CONCLUSION

The dismissal of Counts Two and Three against II;>A, and Col!nt Fol!r against Gwartney
and Zickau, should be affirmed. The decision of the District Col)rt denying an award of attorney
fees for the State Defendants should be reversed and remanded. This Court should award the
State Res]Jondents their costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS)};]_ day of April, 2012.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &. HAWLEY LLP

By~~~9:-;r,._.
~~~~,-;;-;;-Steven F. Schossberger, I
No. 5358
Attorneys for Respondents Idaho Department of
Administration; J. Michael "Mike" Gwartney
and Jack G. "Greg" Zickau
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisl'.)day ofApril, 2012, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing STATE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF by the
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the. following:

.ef-- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

David R. Lombardi
Amber N. Dina
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

..I;::,,,_ Hand Delivered .

Overnight Mail
E-mail
__ Telecopy: 208.388.1300

B. Lawrence Theis
Steven J. Perfrement
BRYANCAVEHRO
1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100
Denver, CO 80203
[Attorneys for Qwest Communications Company, LLC]
Phillip S. Oberrecht
Leslie M.G. Hayes
FARLEY OBERRECHT WEST HARWOOD &
BURKE, P.A.
702 W Idaho, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83 70 I
[Attorneys for ENA Services, LLC]
Robert S. Patterson
BRADLEY ARANT BOUL T CUMMINGS LLP
1600 Division Street, Suite 7 00
Nashville, TN 3 7203
[Attorneys for ENA Services, LLC]

A

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail
Telecopy: 303.866.0200

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail
__ Telecopy: 208.395.8585
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 615 .252.6335
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$tephen R. Thomas
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83 70 l
[Attorneys for Qwest Communications Company, LLC]

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_'-6._ Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.385.5384
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

l

l'j,'

'I

SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

)
)
)

AMENDED

)

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE
EXHIBITS AND EXTEND TIME FOR
FILING APPELLANT'S CROSS
RBSPONDBNT BRIEF

[,

Supreme Court Docket No. 38735-2011
Ada County District Court No. 2009-23757

1.'

)

)

~

)

IDAHO DEPAR'IMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION; J. MICHAEL "MIKE"
GWARTNEY, in his personal and official
capacity as Director and Chieflnformation
Officer of the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION; JACK G. "GREG"
ZICK.AU, in his perso!llll and official capacity
as ChiefTechnology Officer and
Administrator of the Office of the CIO;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

'I

II

I

)

)
)

Defendants-Respondents CrossAppellants,
and

ENA SERVICES LLC, a division of
EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA,
INC., a Dela\'mre corporation; QWEST
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

)
)
)
}

A STIPULA'llON TO Al]GMENT THE RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND EXTEND

Ii

11ME FOR THE FILING OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF was filed by counsel fur the parties on

November 7, 2011, requesting this Court to allow the addiiicin of the items which were not
contained in the Clerk's Record on Appeal and Exhibits received by the Supreme Court on

f

September 19, 201 L Therefore, good cause appearing,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the parties' STIPULA110N TO AUGMENT THE
RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS A.ND EXTEND TIME FOR TifE FILING OF APPELLANT'S

"

BRIEF be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Clerk shall prepare an ELECTRONIC

111

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND

!I

EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S !;ROS&

RBSPmro!?.~IT

BR1EF - Docket No. 38735-2011

I

I
I
I

SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD to include the doctunents listed below and file with this Court and
counsel ON OR BEFORE FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF THE DATE OF NOVEMBER 15, 2011:
I. 12116110 Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Qwest's
Motion to Compel Discovery;
2. 3121111 Affidavit of Steven J. Perfrement in Support of Memorandum of Costs and
Fees;
3. 3/21111 Defendant Qwest Communications Company, LLC's Memorandtun of Costs
and Attorney Fees;
4. 3121111 Defendant Qwest's Brief in Support of Memorandtun of Costs and Attorney
Fees;
5. 3/21111 State Defendants' Memorandtun of Costs and Attorney Fees;
6. 3/21/11 State Defendants' Memorandtun in Support of Request for Costs and Attorney
Fees;
7. 3121/11 Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark;
8. 414111 Plaintiffs Objection to the State Defendants' Memorandtun of Costs and
Attorney Fees;
9. 414111 Plaintiffs Objection to Qwest Communication Company LLC's Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees;
I 0. 414111 Memorandtun in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to the Qwest Communication
Company LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Fees;
11. 41411 I Plaintiffs Objection to ENA's Verified Memorandtun of Costs and Attorney
Fees;
12. 4/4/11 Memorandtun in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to ENA's Memorandtun of
Costs and Attorney Fees;
13. 4/22/1 I Defendants Qwest Brief in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees;
14. 4/22/11 State Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandtun of Costs and
Attorney Fees;
15. 4122111 Memornndum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum;
16. 4/22/11 Reply in Support of Verified Memornndum of Costs and Attorney Fees;
17. 412511 I Second Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees;
18. 4/25/ l l Second Affidavit in Support of State Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees;
19. 4125111 Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to the State Defendants' Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney Fees;
20. 5127111 Plaintiffs Opposition to the State Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees;
21. 5131111 Affidavit of David R Lombardi [in Support of Opposition to Qwest's
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees]
22. 61611 I State Defendants Reply in Support of First and Second Motions for Leave to
Amend Memorandtun of Costs and Attorney Fees; and
23. 7/25/ l l Supplemental Idaho Supreme Court Authority on fssue re: Expert Witness Fees.
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND
EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S CR088 RE8POMDBNT BRIEF - Docket No. 38735-20 ! I

I

I

11
........

)

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD shall
include the following items as EXHIBITS, pursuant to l.A.R. 3 l(a)(4):
I. Electronic Exhibits A -L to the Affidavit of Mark Little; and
2. Electronic Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Affidavit of Patrick Roden [FILED UNDER SEAL].
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for the filing of APPELLANT'S

CROSS RESPONDENT BRIEF shall be reset and Appellant's Cross Res13eBaem Brief SHALL BE
FILED WITH THIS COURT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 30, 2011.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED tf1at this Order SHALL BE NUNC PRO TUNC to the date

-=c.-_,.,_ day of November, 20 I I.
For the Sup eme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND

EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S GROSS RESPONDBl>IT BRIEF

Docket No. 38735-2011
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

SYRlNGA NETWORKS, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION; J. MICHAEL "MIKE"
GWARTNEY, in his personal and official
capacity as Director and Chieflnformation
Officer of the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION; JACK G. "GREG"
ZICK.AU, in his personal and official capacity
as Chief Technology Officer and Administrator
of the Office of the CIO;
Defendants-Respondents CrossAppellants,
and
ENA SERVICES LLC, a division of
EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA,
INC., a Delaware corporation; QWEST
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
).
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 38735-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2009-23757

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD TO INCLUDE CONTENT REQUIRED BY
I.A.R. 28(b)(l) was filed by counsel for Appellant on December 21, 2011.

thereafter,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ENA SERVICES, LLC'S NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD TO INCLUDE CONTENT REQUIRED BY I.A.R. 28(b)(I) was filed
by counsel for Respondents ENA Services, LLC on December 27, 2011. Therefore, good cause
appearing,

R GRANTING MOTION TO AUQMENT THE RECORD- Docket No. 38735-2011

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation r~cord shall include the documents listed below, file
stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
I. Memorandum Decision and Order ·Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, fi!ecstarnped August 4,
2011;
2. Judgment Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, file-stamped October 27, 2011; and
3. Amended Judgment Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, file-stamped December 15, 2011.
DATED this

~ay of December, 2011.

I

Sreph~ W. Kooyoo, Ck<k

cc; Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGME1'11 THE RECORD- Docket No. 38735-20 I I
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JN tHB DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT OF

nm STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI'iB COUNTY OF ADA

3

SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC, fill Idaho
limited liability company,
6

Plafuti.ff,

7

vs.

"

J:DAHO OEP ARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRA'l10N; J. MICHA.EL
"MIKE" GWARTNEY., in his personal i!lld
10
offiofol capacity as Ditector and Chief
Infom1ation Officer ofthe Idaho
j'.
11
D~artinent of Administration; JACK G.
u
"GRl'G" ZICKAU, in his personal and
official capacity as Chief Technology
13 •· · Offi<:er and AdminisITTitor of the Office of
. the CIO; ENA SERVICES, LLC, n Division
l.4 .
ofEDUCATIONNETWORKS OF
AMERICA,
INC., a .Delaware corporation:
15
QWEST COMMUNlCATIONS
i..i
COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,

Cage No. CV-OC-09-23757

:rvfEMORANDUM bEClSION
AND ORDER RE; COSTS A1'ID
AITOJ.U·i'EY F:EES

9

17

Defendruits.

In sepm:llte motions, the Defendants ldaho Departm~ut of Adminis1tation, J, Michael
20

"Mike" Gwarmey ("Gwartney"), Jack G. "Greg" Zi<:knu ("Zickau") (collectively !he "StatQ
21

Defendants"), Edllcation Networks o{ America, Inc. ("ENA") and Qwest Co1nmunications
23

. Company,

I.LC ("Qwest") reqnest costs and anorneys' fees against Syringa Network, J,LC

20

("Syxinga"). The Court will award costs as a matter of righ~ discretionary costs and aitoiney f~

~$ .

:as di~cussoo below.
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llnckgrountl and PrloJ: Px·o<?eedings
l

On March S, 2011, the Com1 entered its Judgl)lent dis!llissing with iirejaclice Syrlilga's

i

I
Complaint imd Dcinand for JUtyTriu.1 as against all Defondai1ts. The Coru:t liao previous1y granted
1 · aimttunry judgment 011
5
6

i

Co\lnts Oue, Two ro1d Three oftb.e Verlfiod Complaint, iu a SubstillJ.te

Memorandum Decision ~ud Order, cmtered July i3, 201.0. '111e Court !Mer granted S\lJIIJnmy

l judgment to the Defendants as to tho reniai:niug Counts Fo~, Five and Six ii1 its Memorw.duti).
· ibecisfon antl Ord~r Re: M~tions fur Slll.Dmai-y Judgment on February 9, 2011. The backgtnllnd of

a

the case i.s set fo:rih in do!>ti\i.1 in thosb decisions.
10

On March 21, 2011, the: Stute Defendantq, ENA md Qwest e.'tch filed a IDemonro.dwn of
costs and atton1.:y foes. Sytinga obj <Jets to the requestF aud tho pllli.i~s ha.,re briefed their positions.

12

The Court C()l1d\1Cted a hearing mto tbe:;e roaitc:rs on June 14, 201 l. Stephen R. Thomas, Moffatt,
Thomas, B~ Rock & Fields, Chul.., appenred and a:rguDd on. behalf of Qwest. Phillip S.

'Obe1.1-echt and Leslie M. G. Hayes, Hall, Fmley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. npperu:ed oil behalf of
15

ENA, ;u:gtmlc.o.t by:M'r. Obcrrecht Merlyn W. Clark, :EU.wley 'I'i:oxdl Elll.'.ris & l.fawli;y LLP,

:ii;

· appew:ed ai:1d argued on behalf of the Sti\!e Defendll.Ots. David R. Loiubardi, C'rivens l?ursJey LLP,
11

iB
19

appeared lllJ.d argued on behalf of Syri0$11. The Co11rt took tlle matters under advL•einent 011 July
25, 2011, the Stirle Defoudants :tiled a supplemlllltal momor<lll.dmu citi.ng to a.recent I<laho

Supreme Cowt decfaion regarding the award of witne.~s fees for exp cits.
Discu~~ion
22

23

A prevailing pai.ty g~nerally is e.utitled to an award. of costR, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(J). 'The

gni<iance for determioJi1g the prevailing party issue is supplied by I.R.C.P. 54{dX2) Which vrov1des
as follows:

MlCMORANPUM DEC'fSION' AND ORDER RE: COSTS AND A.'fTOlU!EYS' FEES-1'AGE 2
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In detortnining which party to an action is a prevrilllllg party aud entitled to costs,
!he !rial cot1rt shall u\ its sound di.si:.tation consider the finaljudgment Qr resu1t
of fuo actirm iii relation to the reUef sought by tho rMpeotive parties. The triill
court k iis sound discrotio11 m1;y cletermiJie that a party to an action prevailed. in
p:irt ahd did nat prevail i.o part, ai1d upon so fin.ding =y nppOTti(lll tho costs
betWceo. and among the partic$ in a fair illld equitable maimer after eotlsidrsring
all of the issues and c!l!itns invor\>OO in the actio1t aud the resultatttjudgmont or
jmlgnll':tlts obtained.

... ).R.C.P. 54{d)(2). The detenn:ina:tion of who provniled is committed. to Uie discretion of the trial
7 . :cmnt. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, !48 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d .ll25, 1127 (2010)(ciling S!iom v.

e · . .Petersoil, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P3d lll,4, J.l:Z6 (2009)), ultbfo casi>, the Cm1rt w:ill fmd tlmt
9 . dt~ defcudunts
lO
11

ai·e tl1e

prev~ling parties because all of the plaintiff's claims have bee!l di.sroissecl.

Ut C.P. 54(d)(l )(C) providos a list Gfcosts tha:t a preniliug party 111ay recover as a

matte. of rigllt as follows:

12

L Court filingfe~.

2, Ach.1a.J fees for $ervico of any pleading or document In flw action whether
served by a public offico.t or other per~on.
15
1$

17
18
19

3. Wiw.e.~s fees of $20.00 per day fot ench d"y in which a wit11ess, othe1· than a
p~ or expert, testifies at a deposition or tu tJ.ie trial Gf ru:i. action.

4. Travel <;:X.pe~es ofwitnJlsses who tr'..ivel by private tl'ansporl:ation, other thl1n a
party, who testify in tho trial of an action, coru.putedlltthernte of$.3-0·mlle, ow
way, from the place of res:idenee, wh.ether·it be )ViWn or :wi'iho.ut the :strife of'
Idaho; travel ~penses of wi!tlesse~ Who j'tavel: 6tlliit thlill .'(ly ,pi'.\vate..
transportation, otbei: !llan a party, computed as the actual travel expem;e offue
wi1neS.• uot to exceed $.30 per mile, Dll.e way, from the )'.I lace of residence of the
wi.me.~s, whether it be within or without tlle stute ofidfl1:lo. ·

~l

:I

5. Expenses or charges of certified copies of do=1ients admitted es evidetice in a
h<;ar,ing or tfae trial of an action.
6, R.:.asonable costs of the prepar-.<tian of models, maps, pfot:llres, photographs, or
other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a. hea.l'b:ig or trial of au action,

but not to
25
26

exc~cd

tile sum of $.50Ct for all suc.h. exhibits o:f each party.

r

fz/22111

1

13: ZZ: 17
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Ofa1l bond p:remiums.

8. R.ensonoble exp"I't wi1uo$S fee,> far an ~pert who testifies nt a deposition or at ~
uial of an action not to exceed !lie :SUiJ.l of $2,000 for Gach ~xpcrt witness for oU
appcOXflltCe3,

9. Charges for reporting and t~a118crihll;tg of a depositio1.1 takou in prepamtfon fur
tl'ia! of [IJ1 action, wheth~r or not r<Y.id ii:tt~ cvi.denM hi tho trial afen action.

5

10, Charges for one (1) OOJlY of any de_position taken by :my of the pm1.ies to the
action in preparation fortrinl of the action.

:1

Notwitl1stnudioJ!,· tbe detemlination that a.;pmtlcnlflr ;party rs entitled :to oosts.~s a

B

n:\atl:!,'T of right under tbis siJbparagi:aph ,(G} UHlll·act!a.u,:J1~c .fi'.W.qo11d:it1 ils·sou1td
dlscrction may, upon proper objecti(ln, ilisttllaw .fl!'.\Y afthtHibovs de::.t:ribe<Lcost~
upon a finding that s<ild. co$ w<::re nat·tr;asoniil:ily :i:ttcll.l'J:ed; .Yi.ere Ji;;:m)TI<'!d ·feit' the::

9 .
10

:1nn:paso.o:t"haJ:i1gsm:emt; w1m;-i11currctUn hnd faith; or were mcuned for tb.e purpi>se
of;increasi:u:gfb.e·cost,q·ti; .ar>y .oth~ party, :rJlc mere :fact that a dilpositlo11 i~ not ll:lod
iu.fhe·ti:ial o:fan actkm, clth~J::fl$ r:>Vid.ence:i;ead into the record or for the purposes of

11

i.mpeachtnent, shall not indicate that the taking of Sl.lch deposition was not
reasoilil.ble, or that a copy of a d~i>ositlou WllB uot reasoDtibly obtained, or !hat tbo
cost of the deposition should ot!tel'Wlse be disallowed, ~o long "" its talcing was

. l2
13

reasonable tu the ·preparation fur trinl in the action.

.

141
ls LR.C.l>. 54(d)(l)(C).
J:n addition to costs as a matter of right, 1.RC.P. 54(d)(1)(D) provides for tlw awom:l of

lS

discretiomu:y co•is ,,g follows:

17 .

i.a

Addltioruu ite;.us of cost .11ot e.tt\11Ilerawd in, or m an ainount Ul excess of tb.at listed
iu [LR.C.J>. $4(.d)(l(C)], m.o.y be. allowed U;J>6n a. showin~ t11at sai.tl CDb'l:s W<n'e
n¢.t;esamy' i:tud· mccepifonil.l Co8l~ l'Ca.~Clll'fil:lly incurred,: aud .s]~QUkt b :tho Jb.tcy~:,'{ .Qf"
j\1$tl¢e. ~e assessed :againi."t $e. ad.Yeise: ~· Th:c trial .coutt, ln. . ni:Jing upon
C>bjer;tkms ·1¢. .sullh .ili:scrciio:rui.Iy ci:lsb contained. fa:th,C:i:nlll.il.ormi.dem of·oosts, ~ha:ll
))lake :C)<\{lr6Ss.:ill.0ln!lll a&.to: v.>liyrucli·:;p~ific .item of discr~tiouary corl should o.r
~lioold .10ot be .allowed. In tr;e· absenue of any objection to such nn item of
di.scretioiuuy cots, the court may disallow on its own motfon any such item.q of
discretion.-uy cots <Uld shall niake express findings suppor.ti119 such aisallowanco.

19

2.l

23

2S
26
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lR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 'Tho deci~ion to award discretionary <;<.>sts is committed to the disctetion of
l

2
3
4

5

·the trial court and the decision will i1ot be overturned absr~11t an :ibuse of dis~1·etioi;. E.g., Fish v.
Smith, J 31 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998)

However, as the rule p.rovidcs, the trial court will only award. discretionary costs ifth.e

prevailing party showed that they were necessary, rel).So11ably incurred, exceptional, and assessable
agaiilst 1he adverse party in the interests ofjustice. Jhama 11. Brewer, 132 ldaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d

i

148, 15$ (.1999). The prcvailiug party has the htltial burden to miike an a&:q_uate showing that sucb

e
··.costs are necessary and xeasoruibly inm1Tod.• exceptional a.lid that the award of sulih costs would be
.9

lO
ll
12

.in the intere,~t of justice. Beco Co11sr. Co., Inc. ''· Ha1per Contracting, Ina., 130 Idaho 4, 11,, 936
·P.2d 202, 209 (Ct. App. 1997). In making itg determination, the trial court is not required 1.0
cvalt!ato costs item by item, but instead may rollke e:qiress findings with regard to tho genori!\

ol:laracter. of the requested costs. Inama, l.32 Idaho at 384 (citing Fish v. Smith, 131Idaho492, 494,
960 P.2d 175, 177 (l.998)).
lS

The award of attorney foes is govemed by I.R..C.P. 54(e)(l) which provides in part:

i6
11

lB
l9

In ru;iy civil action the colJlt may awfild reaoonahle attomey fees, which at U1e
discretion of the comt may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing plll:ly or
paities as deJfo.ed. in Rule 54(d)(l )(B), whei;i. provided for by ro:i.y statute or
con1ra~t.

· I.R.C.P. 54( e)(l ). As to the amoUllt of any foe awnrd, I.R.C.P. 54( e)(3) provides several fa<:;tors

20

. the Court roust consider;
21
22

(A) The time and labor.·.req11il:ed.
(Ii)' 'l;he:novelty·a11d.(tiflforiltyo.i''.tli.e questions.
{C} 'l'lti'l·Skin l'e:quisJ:te to:perlbnn·the:legal servi.ce properly •ncl the experience
and til:>ility·ofthe·atto:mey..in'.the:patticu11!1" field of law.
(D) .Tb.e.prevai!fug·cha:tges .fot like.'\'/.ork.
(E) .:VVhtthet the·fbe.is .fixed:or <;o;iting:ei.\t.
(F) ·'fheJime:Iimitat)ons.impOS~irby:fue. client or the circumstances o.ftbe case.
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(G) The Uillotu1t iuvolv~d w~d the results obtafaed,
(l{J TM 1liid<lsirll.bility oftbe case.
(I) The nature 11:r1d fongth ofi'ho profoseionJll relariombip with the clfont.
(J) Award,<; in situilru: C11ses.
(K) Tl!l!l ..1:~asortlible cost o{ .;uitD.m.ated legal roseaJ·ch (Computer Assisted T.<igru ·
~~llll'arc:h); if the 0011r.t .tmifs.tliat it wa.~ reru;onably neces.~ary in prCJla:r.ing n
.
'
..
party s case.
(i.) Any othi;lt fuctar which the cmut deeine apptoprintein the 1mrtlcul!lt nase.
'

_

5

"

· I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
Th~ Court b.a~ discretion to

7

decide what oonstitut~s uwsoilable foe <ll!d i<; to b~. guided 1Jy the

e . ·above oriteria. Sanders v, Lanlrford, 134 Jdaho 322, 1 '.P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). No one fuctor
shonld be givexi. more weight tu<\n tha others. Electric.. WholfJSale SuppfJI Co, l', Nlel~orr, 136 Idaho

9 .,

10
11

·I 814, 827, 41 P.3d 242, 25.5 (2001). ''Rule 54{B)(3) does not require the clistrict court tom~
1

speci.fic findings in tb.c record, only to considi::r the Btatod factors in detetmiuing thQ. IU!lount ofthe

1~

'fees. When con.~idering the fuctotl!, courts n~d. not demo:ustrate bow they employed any oftbose
n
id
15

i ractots l.n rcathlng an award ainount." Lettunich v. Lemmich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258,
261 (2008).

A..
f?

113NA

ENA requests costs mid fee.~ in the total amount of $394,941.03,

con~isting of $11,423.60

10 :·ill costs as 11.UJnl.tEiro.frlght, $22,770.08 ln discretioL1ary GOs!s and ~360,747.35 in Elitonteys' foes.

The Court wlll m;ike the fullowiu.g awards:
20

:t. The Court will award ENA$11,423.60 ill cost• as a ntatter qfrlgb.t

21

ENA reque~ts $11,42;3.60 U:i <)()sis ai; a matter ofright. Thie amount reflects a total of
:J3

$258.00 in clerkE and s<;XVlce foeq nnd $11,165,60 in de11osition costs. Syliuga.does not object.
:ENA is en.titled t<:> these costs as 11 matter of right. They Co11rt wjil o.ward the full amount as

25

I~CJ.O.ested by ENA.

26

l
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2. The Conrt wUI not make un award of discretion11,r·y- costt:i to ENA.
l

F,NA requests a total of $22, 770.08 iu disc1..,,tl.cm.azy cot>t•. This lllnount refleclli:

2
3

l. CD/DVD copy

$10.00

4

2. Me.ssenger

$270.00

~

3. '.I'eleeopy

.$174.00

~

$3,73.1.12

1

5. Express mail

$269.38

6. Expe:ndirores (!r!lllsCript, travel, etc.)

$16,137.29

7. West111w rescai:ch

$2,039.89

8. Cell pltonef.lu<ltll'llllcf.)

$138.40

I)

g

10
1).

TOTAL

.t2
.i3

.1

$22,770,0S

ENA asserts tbJlt ·t)lese costs w~re necessaty a1id rea.soruibly inonned imd tha:t they were

H :· exceptional "given 1he magnHIUi• of this c!JSe." (Memorandum of Co~ts end Attorney Fees e.f 5.)

.

i:3

'

! $yri:nga objects to these

15

1 were
11

l8

costs generally on the basis tb~tENAhas fu:iled to show thatthe costs

11ece~Slli'Y anc! exceptioua!; inste.ru:i these costs

Ill<> routine

expenses oflltigatiou. Syrhiga.·

• particUlar!y objects to th.e costs llS$Ociafr.d with Wesdawreseru;ch. because LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(K)

$t)ecllicallyprovides for comptrter <1ssisted legal research upon a proper shoWi.ug ns pint of an

19

award of attorn.cys' f<;es.

20

'I'lw Court h<1s revi.ewed Bl11l!.'blt /I. attached to tb.e .March 2 l, 2011 Aifidavit of Phillip S.

21

<-< . Obcrrecht, submitted for in camera reviow. Exhibit A is n eo.mp\1ter g"!1erated report iterniz:iilg all
23

··

of the costs and attamey feos ini;utred by ENA in ccnuection with this action. Tho (',curt does find

fuatth.e above costs wei:e~$ary and.renSDnabJyincun·ed. However, these cost$ appear to be

'12122111
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:rbuti:ne ce>~ts and expenses of litlgatiou, md there has not be on a $ufiiciellt ahowiug that such
·costs can be cl1:ll'acterized as l)J(CeP,tio11al. BNA's conolusory statenlent thitt these C-Osts are

2

exceptional given the magnitude ofthe case is iru:uilicientto warrant an awm•d of discretiotrn.ry
4

.

costs. AB a prev<tiJfog party, ENA Jw; the iu.itial b1,mlen to make an adequat.o showfog fluit such

s · ·:ct,sts ate excoptiorial and that the award would be ln the interest ofjl)stice. Beco Const. Co., liw.,
6

:130 Idaho at 11. ENA has not met this burden. &

1

"
9

10
ll

a.\1 eQ<<rrcise

of discrotioi1, the Co·urt will not

allow tfi;, discretion!\ry CO$lo claimed by ENA.

I

HowiwGr, the Court agrees with Syt.inga Ul.at cnsiii assocl.atod wit:b nutomated legal
teseait:h are more appropriately categorized as a fuctor in awarding nttotmiys' fees illlderl.R.C.P.
54(e)(3). The Cou1t wlll consider this as n factor in aw~rding attorneys fee:i.
3- Tile Court will u.wmrd ll:NA t(tc fall aµtOU.llt fo. attor.ucys' fees, .reduced te

reflect the prevailing rates t11 Boi$e, llfah~
13

14

ENA requests attomeys' fees purslUIIlt tC) Idalto Code§ 12-120(3), as it.is the

.tii·evailing p<l'(ty in a civil actioI>. to tecovei: in a co111mercial tr.ans.action. Tb.at section provides:

17
lB
19

20

Tu ap.y civil actfo1< to, rocmiey ;in an op en a~.count,. account stated, i1ott;, b:ill,
ne,gotfable,·:instnn11ent, .suai'iw.ty, or contract relating. to 1lro .putcbase w sl!.le cf
goo~, :v.rttes,,.ooerelilmdisc, <Jr servi"!'-~ .and fu :miy· oommerdil.1: t\'flnsaction 1intess.
Citherw!se- j)l"GVidod· by, h1w; tbe :pteYailingc ;party shfill .be ,.allp1v;.d .a. l1!'.:l.!ibl1abfo
attorney's .fee t'o be stt.b;rtlie:cl)W:\; to be,tm;edari.d'iXIHeb:ted rui Msts.
·
· Idaho Cod.e § 12-120(3). ''ThG term 'con:u:oerdal tumsuction' is defined to mean all tr.a1Jsacti()11s
except transactions for personal or household purposes.'' Jd.
''The critical fost ii1 ciete.rminiug whei:lier a civil action is for a oommt:roial trmsaction is

23

: whether tho cOll:l1narcia1 transaction comprises the gravamen oftlw lawsuit; it lllllSt be infogral to

fbe clBim and constitute th~ basis upon which the party is artempti.11g to recover." Jo/wl'W!f!1t v.
:Utterbeck, 146 !daho 423,, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008) (ciii.ngJtsser Etec. Y. Lost River-

Zo
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I
i

2
.· 3 .

Ballitllr:s Tech.. Inc., 1451daho !H:Z, 9Zl, 188 l'.3d 854, 863 (2008)). Additionally, "one who
'. _Silccessfully defend$ against the ou.futGm;ueut of a co1ttract, whsn the gravamen oftl:t.i, trE111Sru:tio11 is

..a commercial. tran!Jaction, ui;vei.ihe.less inay be entitled to attoiney fa<>s even U101tgh the court ruleil

4

tb.at no coutractexists or it fa imenfor~bk" Ln:wrenae v, Jo11es, l.24 Idal:m 748, 752, 864 P.Zd

s

194 (Ct. }\pp. 1993); sc& also Mackay v, Four Ria'l'S packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d

6 · 1064, 1017 (2008) (&iatiug: t:hal ''fueprevailingpru:tymayrecove.d'BCS 'regardless of the prcioftha!

the commercial transaction did iu fnct occur."'). ENA asserts thilt there is no qiu;~tion thnt this is a
~·

lO

Syrlnga does not diop\tto that this is a cmumercial transaction, but argues t)lat ENA is not

11

entitled to attomeys' fees bficlmse t11e Teaming Agroemcnt states that each party would pay its own

12

attomeys'

l~

15

16

17

fo~5

and expiiuses. The relevant provision of the Temilil.g Agreement provides:

4. General Tile pw:ties can =end this Agreen.:ient only by a written agrlll'me11t of
the parties that idmi.tifies itself as an amendment to this Agreeincgt, The pllr\ies elm
waive this Agreement only by writing executed by the party or parties agai.mt
whoru the waiver is $Ought ta be enforced. Each party shall pay its ovmfees and
exj)ens&s (inclllliittg withr:mt limitation, t/ie f?ru a1id C!Xpenses of its agent;,,
rep·r~seNfatiV<ZS, attomeys mid accountan:ts) incurred ill cormectfon with the
negotiation, drafti11g, execulio11, dElivery, tmd peJformance of this Agreement imd
the trrlnsaations it cmtleniplates.

10 '. (ToruuiligAgree11:1eint at§

19

4) (emphasis added). 1

Th(l above guoted !tmguage do~• J.lOt apply. The fees E.t'-lA iucimecl indefendiJ1g this iwtion

23

H

iS · 1 /\.copy of ili<> Teaming Agrc=nt i> attached~• 13.itlublt I. !o tb~ Novembor 23, 2Dl0 Affid•vlt ofi.o.Jie M.
~aye.I in Supp01t of ENA

ServiObS LLC'S Motion fot S\mtranry Judgmrot,
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ENA's Toa.tiring Agreement p<1rtuer sued ENA when the Stlte did 11Ctmake the award th~t Sy1inga
l

l10ped ibr.

2

Tu~

3

Co11r! will find. that th~ u.ode:rlying aotion against ENA iE an actiol! to recover in"

cott1D;tercial tr= action and ihat ENA is ontit:led to ru1 award of fees pwsnaiit to Idaho Code § 12·
5

120(3).
:BNA requMts a total of $361), 747.35 in attoweya' fees a.•d paralegal's :f~~sz co1isisting of

7

foes inmwed by its local oounsol and the fues incurred by its uonnttl Co\liJ.Sel from Nashvill«,
a ...
-TeDllcssOO. The total fllnou11tillcurrod for ENA'~ local C-Oll!IBelartd p!!talega( services is
9

.

:f. :$176,613.00. for.11m work of Phillip $. Ob~n-eoht, a shareholder in t:be :Bois~ firm HQU, Farley,

10 .
11

12
. 13

·.g
15

·

Obeuecht & Blantou, P.A. withabonttlllxty-four {34) y<:i<:U.'S experience who expended 364 hours at

.:the rate of $2.50.00 p~ hoU\; Lesli~ M. IL-iyl;)s, an associate attorney
. at th~ some firm with a.bout
three aud a halt' (3.5) years aperlencewho expended 399.80 hours at the rate of $165.00 per hour;

.!llld JuUe A Shipley, a paral~gal who expended 189.40 bilta\Jle hours at $100.00 pet hour. Syringa
. ·obj evts to these au1ounts, arguing that ENA hlls not provided ~ufficieut infoxmation for tlie Court to
·consider in light ofthe Rule 54(e)(3) factors.

11

The Cotlrt has r.eviewoo the p01'li~' atguments, affidavits ani:i attached. exhibits, ;'Peclfically
19

20

Exhibit A to 1he Ma.rch2l, 20U Obcnccht Affiduvit, and fa ~atisfied that ENA has provided

!sufficient infoIJlJ.atjon for

21 . · 'S4{e)(3)

th~

Court to det:ennine the ru:uount of attorneys' fees i1t light of the Rule

factors ..Fu.'1Jler, the Court .hns con.rid~red ail of the factor.• set forth above ~d will find

23

25

l· Wl)lle.1,1orll.legnl.s.•rviM~,.$eelt\ll!Hill·in nuturo, mo..notreeoycnible tl!l ~ttomey's .f""!l,.¢:8~ l{iiw~ v. H.iM.i; tl9
Jd~hif &41, :9.34·J'.2d .20.(l997.), SU<;!1;im~:l:>e.zoooru~lil·5:f:ihl.'plil'liiega! J'?'~d ra~li1Tln!·oll~'ll:. wo\ild
n.ie·J>OOiJ.perf<itilloil·b)l:in.\:attorney, lt; t,;-tli<i~erJ!I;• Fftv:Ji!!il.tJJ.rr·water ~ ifu>jl!cl, .l46 lillll!b .s21;.:S1S., !:9.9
P~ll.'1-02, f.W.(2-00S).•Syrlllgo.lifis·uot:¢j1~~llwawnro..<lfp'aia!eta1.feell'O~thllib!!Sls.:
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that ENA' s request foi· the foe..• ofitll !ocat cotinsel is rcasouuble. !he Court will awnrd the full
1
2

3
~

·a.moun.t of nttoineys' foeo requested by ENA witl:t i·espect to the work pcrfonned by ENA' aloc~l
counsel, $1.76,613.00.
BNA also requests attorneys' foes in the mnount of $184,134.35 fur work performed by

~

BNA's Tennessee cotmsel Robert S. Patterson, Brodky Arnnt Bowt CUitUniug.~. IJ,,1', and

6

.Christina TulJeU,

T

a paralegal at fu6 fum. Mr, Pat("rso.n hill.eel at a .ratm of $435 pet .hour fo.t woxJ::

p«i!'f01med !rt 2010 and $445 per lioui· for work perforuietl in ;?.011. Ms. foh<i!I billed at uale of
$!80 forworkperfonnedi.n 2010 and $185 for workperfo1:med in 201 l. The C-Oort has rnviewed

10
,_

1

12 '

13

the March 21, 2011 Af.Eiclavit of Robert S, Pattenrou !llld tl:i.e attached exhibits and .is saifafied that it
\contains suf.ficient infmmation to allow the Court to detemrine the am.ouut of fees in light o:fthe
Rufo 54(e)(3) factors,
F1.111her, the Courlhas considered lho~o fuotors

~at for'.h

above imd fin<li> thatthe aI11ount

:3:1\d type of work perfonned by.Mr. Pntletso.n "!ldM~. TubeII are reasonable. However, the Court
'will fiu<;l. that the hdurly ratei; chlll'.ged by Mr. Patterson and Ms. Isbell nre significantly higher than
16

•.'tJ.ie Jocal.prevailiug rntes. &e Lettunir:h v. t.erl.unich, l41Idilho425, 435, 111P.3d110, 120 (2005) · ·
l?

18
19

(statillg that "[i]n d.etoJ:1ll.ibiug the reBsomwlen""s of an hourly rate ... the court should consider
the fee rates geuerally prevailing in the pertinQ!.lt geographic area....").The Com-twill make afull

20

award for 1b.e ntunbei: Of hours worki;d by tho B1-adley i\.r:!llt Boult Cummings, LLP will redu~e the

21

ru.n6unt of at1.-omeys' fees fur tb.e work of Mr. Patterson and Ms. Isbe.ll to reflect the prevailing

a · .hour.ty rates iu .Boiso, Xdllho. The Cow:t wiU 1•educe Mr. .Patterson's rM<:i io $ 250.00 per hour and
23

will reduce> Ms. Isbcll's i:ate to $100.00 per hour.
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L$tly, the Court bas considered the request for autontated legs! resea.rchfoes pursullllt to
l

l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(K), The Court is fam\lim: with the fogiil research done in this case and will lind
3 J:' that EN'A's rajut;.St for Wc,stLaw chargos in the mnuuut of$2,039.89 is trl:\SOllable and wlll award

these as part <lftho attrn:neyfe~ awru:d,

B. Qwest
Qwest seeks a tot~! of $588,863.44, made up of $11,787.21 in co~s as a inatter of right lrild
1

$577,076.23 in atto:rueys' fees. Qwest does not seek discretfonru:-y costs. the Court will 1:na\re the
folloWi.ng awwrts:
1. T11e Courtwtll awa1·d Qwest $11,787.21 ill cost~ as a ntatt"I' of right

lO

Qwest seeks $11,787.21 in cost!J as a matter of rigbl, purst1a11t to I.R.C.P, 54(d)(l)(C)(9).
12

II

TbJ.s amomi:t reflect& costs incurred In connection with repoi;tJng and lT2JJ$Crib:i11g nun1erous

13

,

depDsitions. Syringn dOos not di'lpute that QW<>stis the prevailing party and does not dispute the»e

14

~$Is,

lS :

The Court will award tl:ie full ru:nount rcqu.,,,fod by Qwest for costs M

'I lllaiter ofright

2. Qwest is entitled to attorue.fs' fees

16

Qwest seeks attom~)'E'

f~s

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12.·120{3), as

th~pnvailiug,poo:lyin

l1

18
19

:io

21

n
23
24

16

,au action to recover in a cowuercial transaction, and Idaho Code § 12-121, on the basis l:bllt
, ,SyrJ11aa's lawsuit agair1st Qwest was ,iiivolaus.
"

11,.

ldabo C-0<11l § 12-120(3)

Qweot seeks iittvmeys' fee:> pursn11I1t to ldnho Code § 12.. 120(3}, arguing it is the prevailing
pruty in au action to recover iu ~ ro,mme;cial trroi.<actiou. Syci11ga objects, essentially arguing tbat

alttwugh a co=ercial lrnusaction was involved iii thia case, the Teaming Agreement WI.Ill bctwei;n

, Syringa and BN"A, not Syring:a and Qweot. In their reply, Qwest does not dispnte that the

.
,
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I
. 1

con:u:iterclal ti:a11siictiein !ll\ISI be b<ltWccn the parties, but.instead contends that the "O<Jmmerd'll

2

' transaction" hero fa the Idaho Education Network (".JEN") procurement, u rumti-parfy OOOIDlorciaJ

i'ransa.ctiOtl. in which the parties WC1'6 "'lually involved.
4

As sta.ted in scclioP. A above, "It]he critical test in deterr:nlnfog whetb.;a- a civil action, is for

· a oonnt1ercial !1'.llnsactfon is whether the couimercial transaction comprises tho gravam.eu of th~

5

l.a.wi3Uit~ i.t must be iitegral to the claim and constitute the llssis upon which tile party is attemptin.g

1
3

to recov~r." Joha/Zf1$81' v. Ullerbeek, 146 Idaho 423, 43:2, 19G P.3d 341., ~50 (2008). "Idaho Code§

9

12-120(.3) does uotrequire thrrt ther~ be a cont.rect between the parties before the silltute is applied;

io

th~

ll

statute only requires t.hat there be a corn.mercln! tra11Saction." In re Unive.rsity Pli.ici:/ldalto

Water Ce,,ter Project, 146 ldal:ta 527, 541, 199 :l'.3d 102,

n6 (2008). However, the action must

12

· arlse from a commerci1ll trnrumction between tM parties. BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v. J-U-E Eng'rs,
13

Inc., 145 Iditho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008).
The Court agreoo with Qwest. 'fhis lawsuit arose ottt oftb.~ Swtc's dual aw<!rd to Qwest fllld ·
16

"ENA, which had parlnered with Sydnga under the Te$.1Jl)ng Agreement, an<i then the SlAfL' s

17

·issuance ofidentical statowide bfoi:iket purchase ordera to Qwest and ENA. As Qwest point> out,

18

the IBN procurement contll!npli'ited numerous commercial t1<msactfon.s beiwee11 Syringa and

:w

Qwest, eveJJ. though the direct prinie cor1tract would be between Qwest lllJ.d fue Stato and/or ENA
and lbe State. The Teaming Agreement was but one aspect of this larger conntierc:ia! tran.saclion,

zi

The Comt will finrl that Qwest is the prevailing party in an action to recover in a
commercial transaction.

23 •
21'.i • :

25 ..
26

f.
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b. Idaho Code§ 12-121
Qwest also sceb attomeys' fees pm·sUlUJi to Idaho

Cod~

§ 12-121. Attom~y foeo 1md~dhis

pro>'lsiou is not aroatt~r ofrigllt, and may only be award~d "when th" Court, in its discretion, 'is

3

le.ft with lh~ abiding belief that the acl:iou was puroued,

. 1

de(end~d,

or brought liivolot\sly,

1lfrteasoruilJ!y, or withOUt foundation."' Nampa & Meridian Irrig. Di.rt. v. Wash Fed. Sa.11., 135
·~

Idaho 518, 524-25 (20Dl) (q1>0Li.ng Owner-Operator 111d. Dnvm·s A$soc. v. Idalto Public Util.

. •, · rD:>mm 'n, 12s Idaho 401, 40s, s11. P.zd s1s, s2s (1994)).
a ·
9

t

ln light of tl;i,<:l Court's denision to award attorneys' fe;cs pursu®t to Idaho Code § 12·

.. ·120(3), The Court will not add:reas whotb.er attorneys' fees ~hould be awru:d~d umle.r this sectfon.

lQ

S, The Court will award Qwestt!Ie full >1ro~1mt in
re!leet tile prevJ1Uing rates ill Iloi~e, Idallo

l2

~ttomeys•

fees, i:edllced to

Having concluded that Qwest is the prevailing party in an action to recover, itt a commercial .··

13
.

o:a11saction. th~ Court will gr~ut attorney fees to Qwest,

l~

'.th.~ issue thus becomes the

ru:nount of

, reasonahl<:> attorney fees to which Qwest is llJ'.titled. Qwest seeks a toti.1 of$S77,076.23 in

15

16

attorneys' fees. This BlllOUllt reflects $63,225.17 incurred for the worlc of Qwest' s local ooimsel at

11

Moffeit., Thomas, Banet~ Rock & Fields, Chtd. and $513,321. 73 in.curred for the work o!Qw..st's

Denver counsel at Ho.me ll.obert.~ & Owen, Ll,l?.
Steven R. Thomim, a pmt1er at Moffatt, Thomas, Banet!, Rook &, :Fields, Chtd.wos the
20

ptimazy attor.ney ftom Boise who charged at the rate of $265.00 per hour. Oilier par!ncrs charged

21 .

22 .
23

$265.00 per lJQur. P!ll'alegal assistants chargro at tb.e rnte of $115.00 per hour.

Steven J. Pc1freroont is the primary attorney from Holme Robe™ & Owen, LLP om.dis a
:Partner there. Mr. Pectrernont clui.rged Qwest an ho1u:ly rate Df $:315 per hour. Kathy M. Taylor was

25

the priinacyparaleg-d.! used by Mr. l'orftement Ms. Taylor's work W<>S b11led at $195.00per bout.

26
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· T:n addition, work was billed by: B. Lawrence Thei~, a partner at the :finn (77.$ hours x $400.00);
J.

2

. ·Meredith A. Johnston, an associate attorney (187.9 ho11rs x. $240.00); Jessica D. t~-uda, im

:associate attorney (78.1 hours x $220.00); librnrlan I<;i!lyFmmJng (2.8 how.i; x [unknown rate]);

a •· litigation s1ippoxt specil11ists Shati Bjorkqnfot (9.8 .hours x $200.00), Bill Payno (25.7 hams x
$175.00), .Kathleen Wener (30.5 hour x $200,00) aJJ.d Bryan Briggs (1.1 hall.rs x $200.00).
6

·1

Syringa ~rgues, as it did wifa E'.NA, that Qwei;t has fuiled to present sufficiel'.\t evidence fo.r
. the Co\ll1: to deteimine the reasonableness of Qw~st's attorneys' fees in light of the LR.C.P.

B

. 54(e)(3).
The Court has reviewed the pru:tics' ax1punents,

affidavit~

and attached exhibits and is

11 .. satisfied that Qwest has provlded sufficient information for 1he Cou1tto make its detennination.
12
13

·H

.ts

Fnrther, tbe Court haS considei'ed the RliJo 54(e)(3) factors. In light of those factors, the Court will
· .fitid t.ha.t the

atuountrequestecl for Qwest's local counsel is re~sonable. Additionally, the Comt wil) .

find that the amount and the wo~1qierfowned by Qwest' a Denver counsel was reasonable,
However, the Court will find tli.at tho hourly rates c:hm:ged is significantly higher than the

16

. 1rrevaili11g rates for like services in view of the looal p.revaUing J;at.es. Si>e Leltrmich v. Lettunic/z,
17

· 141 Xdaho 425, 435, U l P.3cl 110, 120 (ZOOS) (stating that "[i]n deternllitlng the reasona11lei1ess {)f
18

19
20
21

.. a.n hourly rate ... the court should coru:id"r the fee rates generally prevailing in the pe1tiuent
geographic area...."),The CoUJi: will :reduce the amount of attorneys' fees far the wo.r.k of
· 'Qwest' s Denver

counsel to refiect the. prev(liling hourly rates in Bois~, ldabo. The Court will

22.

reduce the rates clwrged as follows: mte for partners: $2.65.00 p~.rhour; rate for associate

n

·attomeys: $165 .OO per hour; rnte for pai:alegals: $115 .00 per hour.

24

25
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c. State Defendants
l.

The State Defen(iants request $9,904.155 ill costs as a11'.!att~r of right, $27,248.34 in
:> ..dlsc:retiouary costs aud ,$348,052.88 in !!tlo1neys' foes putzuantt() Xd!iho Code §§ 12-120(3) llIJ.d
4 · , :12-121,

totaling S3SS,205.87. Xn addition, the State Defondan!1l h!l-ve fi.\c<l two motfo~" far leave to

Mnciid t)jeit nlemorrfuilum of CQBls and fees to include requc::sts nuder rdaho Code§§ 6·91 SA, l 2-

i

The C'<rnrt will gr:mt l:lle State Defendants• !llOti()lJ. for loav~

to amend

The State befendim:ts nx1uost l~av~ 1o amend their momorau.dmn of costs and foes to add
9

'I.dlllio Co<le §§ 6-9l8A and 12·11? WI

~ddition~l

lllJthority for tb.c award of a.ttom~ys' fees and

!daho Code § 10-1210 as an additional bas)~ for the award of co•ts. Syrlnga o1)jects, argu~1ig that a
motion to enlarge thue Ulld.cr I.R.C.P. 6(b) and I.RC.P. 54(d)($) 1-equires "good cause showit" aud

12

13 · tbe State Defend:mts have failed to sh11w good ca.nse for not identifying all oflhe bti.'1£$ for
1! .

15

recovery in its original m(J!llonmdum of co~ts 1md fees. The State Defendants argue that ii:.!; motion

.is not a motion to enlarge time brought nnder I.RC.P. 6(b) ai:td IJtC.P, S4(d) because it did timely

·

io
file its iuert10Il!ndi.ID1 of costi;. lUstoad, tl\e Stat" Defondants i·e.quest that th.e Co11l't \J:<iat its motions
11

to amend like a Rule 15(a) JJlotioo. to amend a complaint whe.a1 justice so require;:, mid there ism
showing of bad fttith, 1mdue delay, dilato.ry CJ:Jnduot and no tesulfo1g p.rej11dice to the nou-moving
pai;ty.

The decision to amend a memor~idum of oost and fees fa CQ!tunitted to the diRcretion ofthe lr

21

trial court and will uot he dis(wbed a~sent s. showing of o!eflt error. Ada Coi<nry Hwy. Dist. v.

22

.

23

· Acarrequi,

105 Xdaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), "A comtmay, in its discretion, allow such

amendment,

unle.~s

to do so would d.cprive the complaining party of some llllhstantial right." Id.

26
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SytlligEi bas folly hriefod and a:rg11ed the additional ba~e~ oftecovei:y and thcte is no
l
2

indioati61l. fu~t it would be deprived of any snbstll.ll.tfal iight. As an exero)$e of di~crotion, the. Court

3 ·wlll illlow tha State Def®-dants to amend thcir numwnmc!tun of costs and foes to ~dd Id~o Code
4
5

7

2,

lO
ll

'

Tire Court will award the State Dcf'endants $9,904.65 In c~sts us n matter of
right

The State Def~dants req1iest $9,904.65 in costs as a matter of right pursuant to LR.C.P.
54(d)(l)(C). This amo11rtt reflects a $58.00 filing fw

9

..

§§ l2·U7, 6·91SA ond 10··1210 as ba.les forrecovcry.

· Syriliga do<;s

and $9,904.65 for deposition trauscri11ts.

not dispute the amount requciitw. The Court will award the full amount l!S requi;sted

! by the St(l.te Defendants.

3.

'.l'lle Court will nut awnrd discretionary cost$ to the State Dd~'!ldants

12

.Additionally, the State Defendants request $2.7,248.34 in discretionurycosts purstlllllt to
13

I.R.C.P. S4(d)(l)(.b) and Idaho Cc.de§ 10-1210. Tbi.q amount reflects the followlng:
1~

16

23 .

25

1. Postage and shipping charges

$198.46

2. Copy charges

$5,920.65

:t Messenger ch~rges

$161.95

4. Co01puter assL<rted fog<!l research ebarges

$3,236.'iO

.5 • .ASCENSIO document prc:x:essing charges

$5,581.86

6. Expenses paid Givcus Pooley for data <OORt sharlng

$941.02

7. Medilltion fei:>S prud to JAMS

$1,863.62

8. Fees paid K. Redlich for hearing transcripts

$537.50

9. Courtb.ou$e p arldng fe115

$13.00

10. Ell:J)enses for bincl.ei:s and tabs fur documents

$1,979.85

26
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$6,81.3.53

),

TOTAJ,:

2

$27,248.34

3

The State Defendants do 11ot explain in their 111emorandum in support ofrequest for co$tS

4

·an.d fees wliy any of the above was uec1J.%aty, reasonably iucurred, exceptional aud assessable in

> the intetost of justice. Syrillga thu.s objects to these costs m-guii1g tfart the State Defendllnts hnvc not
s . shown the costs to be exceptional and instead, the costs are ordinary expenses of any laWsl!it. The
i

. State Defendants reply tll.llt these el(oeptional costs we:re incur.t"ed as a tosult of Syr:inga's

8

"aggte$sive litigation tactics aiid iJtsistonce upon extensive discovery which amounted to not.hillg
10

more than nn tu:!Pl'Oductive fishing expedition...." (State Defendants' Reply at 18.) Jn addition,
the State befondants argue that in d~clarato1.y jud.gmet1fa such a~ this, "the court may !llake such

12
13

award 0£ C<;lsts

a~ 1nay seem

equitable and just." Idaho Cod(I § 10·1210.

Umler I.R.C.P 54(d)(l)(D), discretionary costs may be awarded. to 1he prevailing pmty

14

when the costs are necessary and ;easonably inccun·ed, w:b.ere the nat.ure of the case is itself

l.S

.excceptioi:Ull and tho costs are as:sessab.k against tho a.dverse party in the interest of justice. Stie

~6

: Hayden Lake Fite Protection Dist. v. Alcom, 141 ldaho 307, 314, J09 P.3d 161, 168 (:ZOOS). The
17
lO

. Court 11.llS reviewed the afiidavit of Merlyn C.1~k, and attached e~hibits, detailing the !l!;lture oft.be
costs incurred and does find that. these costs were necessary and reas6Uahly i11curred by the State

20 , Defou.dants. However, 1he State Defend~mts ha:vc not made a sufficient showing that these costs
21

were exceptional. All a p~i:ivaili:ug party, th.<:> State DefendM;1.ts have the initial burden to malrn an

,22

adequate showing that such cosl:s W(!l'e uccel'sllr)' and exceptional, reasonably incurred ai1d the

23

.awal.'d would be in the interest of justice. B~co Contr. Co., [>u:., 130 Idaho at 11. Th<: State

26
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Defendants hav" not n:tet their bt1rden in doing so, Accordingly the Court will not make an awa,.d
1 .

. of discretionary costs to the State Defund!lll!s pu»suant to LR.CJ' 54(d)(l)(D).

2

.,.

Co\tnts Two ;md 'three of the Ved.fiod Complailit sought a decl!!!ator:y jwlguieut that tbe

3

'

.
I' ·.awards to Qwest
and ENA wcr~ ill viollllion ofstnte law imd should 1)e voidcd. ldaho Code§ 10-

~

121 Oprovides an alternate ground for itWlll'ding cost!: in an ai;tion for doo!atatory'Te)ief. The court

5
6

. cru.1 m1tlw an 11.Wril'd ofoosts upon a ftrullng that ::.n aw.rd WllS "eci.uit.'!lile and just". I<laho Code§

'

lO•U.10. The Supreme Court affirilled a tri.al co1Jrt'a awru:d of co1<1.i; pursuant tn this stltute in Jn r~
Ulti.VtJr~ity Pliicd!daho Wati:r C~nter Project, 146 Icl..1ho 521, 199 P.3<1102 (2008) wh.ere thetdal

9.

court dctern:dned ti1at the 11on-prevailu1g P"1tY chose to p~nue "navel" theories to avoid liability.

10

Id. at .545-46. ln this

11

oas~,

the Court does not characteriz,,, .Syrlnga's dcclaiutoty jud.gment clahm;

12 ..as "novel". The State award.~ theae CO!ltracts in so.ch~ way ns to exclude Syringa entitoly from
1:i '

lJa.tti<~patiJ.lg iu the work. k m exercis• of dfaci:ction, the Court w.ill decline to make au award of

:corn pl\rsuant to Idaho Code§ J0-1210.
15

How<>Vcr, the Court agrees that the coat$ of nntomated legal .resenrch is tnor<;1 approprfotcly
cafogi.1ri-i;"'1. llS a factor in awPl"ding attom.ey foea 1L1.der J,.'R.C.P. 54(e)(3). The Collrt will consider

. the autmuated legal research us a fuctor to be consider~d as part of tho tequ.est for attorney fees,

1$

,u

4. Attorneys' Fees under Idaho:; Code§§ 12-120(3), X2·121, 12-117, 6-918A

Th.e State Defcmd2nts requ.est $385,2.05.87 Ju attorneys' foes purs1mut to Idaho Code §§ 12-

20

21 .. 120(3) !ii.td

I 2-121. Syrlnga objects, arguing that under PotlaJoh Educ. Assoc. v. Potlatch School

Di.st, No. 285, l48 Id.nho 630, 226P.3d1277 (201 O), ldaho Codo § 12-117 is the exclusive st.'ltuto
'

23

'ut.1der wbich a state entity may seek attorneys' fees. 11ie State Defondauts essentially reply thErt
Potfatch 111 l!.11 abe:runt decision aiid the statement in the case stating such is merely dicta.

I

26 .
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Idaho Code § 1:2-t20(3) provides for attorneys' fees to th~ prevailing piuty ili, among otber
1

things, an action to recover on a contract related to tbe purchase or sale of good.'J, wares

2

metchru.idise or services, or a:n il.Ction to recover in. a commercial transaction. Tdaho Code§ 12-

120(3). i'be statute defmes ''.party'' to mean "any per.son, paxt11ership, coqJ01;ation, a.ssociation,
pdvata organization, the i;tate ofldaho or political subdivision thereof. "Id. Thus, u11der the plain
6

. J.ahguage of the statufo i.t would appear that tbe State :Oefendallts may seek attorney$' foes pm·suant

7 .

.:to ldtiho CDcle §§ 12-120(3) and/or 12-121.
a.. .

Westway Const., Inc., v. Idaho 1'ra.nsp. :Oep't, 139 Id1iho 107, 116, 73 l'.3d 721, 730 (2003); State

11

r2 · ·v. Hagern1an Water Right Owners, lllc., 130 ldaho 718, 72'3, 947 P.2d391, 396 (1997). In

.Potlatch, the court denied a school district's request for attomeys' fees aga:hist a school district

13
14

· btotlght pursuant to

lo

Xdaho Code§ 12-121. Jd. Similarly, the court fo. Smith v. Washington Co1mty

. Ida.ho, 150 Jdaho 3B8, _ __, 247 l'.3d 615, 619 (2010) followr..d Potlatch and denfod an individual'~

l,6

.request .for fees pursuant to Idaho Cod.e §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 agai.t1sta county. Ser: also Brow.>1
l '/

v. City ofPocatello, 148 l<laho 802, 811-12, 229 l>.3d 1164, J 173-74 (2010) (restating Potkltch's

18

. holding that Idaho Code § lZ-1l7 is the cxclu~ive moaus for awarding attorney fees for the entlties

19 ..

'to which it applies).

20

Despito its con.cl11sion that this case is rooted hi. a commercial \1'atl!laction, the Court is

21
22

constwinecl t:o follow the Supreme Court's decisions in the above casos ruid will decline to co1JBide.r

23

· aroquest for attorneys' foes pUJ:IDlant to Idaho Cod.c §§ \2-120(3) or lZ-121. Idaho Code§ 12-117

24

iS 1he exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for atate agencies.

25
26 .
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l

!
Jdaho Code§ 12-1l1 provides as follows:
l

(1) tJnless othsiwise provided by stniute, in ru:iy a-Oministra:tive proceeding or
clviljud.icl.al proceeding involvltif; as advet'SC parties a state agency or political
subdivisfo11 o:nd a person, the .>We agency or politital subdivision Dr the court,
as the case xuay be, shaU award tho prevailing party !$asonable attorney's .fees,
wifuess foes a11d other reasonable c1q:11m.ses, if ~t :finds tbat !he nonprevaili11g
party acted. without a reasonable basil! ill. fact or law.

3

5

(2) !£a party to an n.dmirusttative proceeding o.r ro a civil judicial pto~ding
prevails on a portfon of the ca.,e, and the state agency or political oubdh~sioll
or !he court, as tho r,aea may be, finds that the nonprevailfug pru.ty acted
without a re.Jlsonab!e basis in fact or law with :respect to that po:rtiall of tho
case, it shall a.ward the parlially prevaili.iig party xeasom1b!e attoroey's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses 1'1ith respect to 1ha1 portion oftb6
CDte on which it prev~iled,

6

lO
11

12 .

15

(3) P.icpcnS<'\S awfl!d:ld against a ~tat~ agr.ncy or political subdivision pw:suant
to this scctimt shall be pl)id from fwuU! i;n the regular operat.\11g budget of•J1e
state agency or political sub division. 7£ sufficient Mi.do am not available in. the
budget of"tbe state agency, the cxpemes shall be considered a o\abn governed
by the prov:i.sions of s§Q!i9.,i;t..§2:20l8, Idaho Cos!e. If sufficiei1t funds are not
available in the budget of the politfoal subilivision, ll\e expenses shall he
consld~red a claim putauant to cha,pter 9, title 6, rPaho Olde. Every stat(}
ngency or polilica.L subdivi,sion against which litigation expenses have been
iiwarded unde.rthls act sb.atl, nt the time of submission ofim propo£~.d bud.get,
submit a report to 1b.c gove:r11,1,llentul body which appropnate:i its funds in
which the amount of: expc,nses awarded and paid under this act during Jhe
fisM! year is stated.

(4) Fot the pui11ose:; of this section:

:LB

(a) ").>erson" shall mean any i.udividual, p<1rlnershrp, corporali<m,
flllSoci.ation or <JJJY other private orgruiize.tion;

19

20
21

{b) "Political ~:ubdi vision" shall mean a oity, a county or any ta,xins
district.

22.

(c) "State agraoy" shall mean any agoocy

B.ll

de!:ii.led irl section 67-

5401, ldaho Code.

23

Idaho Olde § 12-117, lJnc!ertbis section, t!J.e Depra1iueut of Ac!minleti:atfon can ob tam an award

of foes if die Court finds that the non-prevailing pai:ty, Syringa, aoted without a re<iSoJJ.able basis in

25

25 '
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fuct or !Aw. Based upon its revfow of' the ei1tire r~coi;cl, tho Court cannot Jind that Syringa O.ct~d

: witholJt a rcai;<:inabho basis hi foct or law.

2

Dospit~ Jhe fact that a(l of its

claims against the State

be:tendBIJ:ts Wet<' dismissed !1(1 the result of ~mruu.ary d~1.<mnioat\ons, that, in itself; doC!l not mean
that the clau:ns were wilhout a rila~'<l\1nblc basis. Syri11ga had some evidence of nnimus on the part
5 : .. pf au importfult ~tate actor.

The State l)efondants also re'lue~t attorney:i' fees p,ursu.ant to Idaho Code § 6-9 l BA,
7

· "argulng that Syd.uga.'s cl:Jims agai.ut1 the Stat~Do'fendantil wer" :li:ivolous, unrcasonalllo lll)d

e
brought in bad faith. Syriuga objocfa, vrguirtg thnt while Idaho Code § 12-.117 is the exolu.liv" basfa
9
10
.)l

· upon which a state ageni;y can claim attom!}y foes, Idaho Code§ a·918A is the exclusive basis
. u.pon wbich C-wnrtuey mid Zickan, as state employees, can claim attorneys' fe~s on t:b.e tort claims

12 ' against them. Syringa argues thn! the State Defendmii~ have not segregated their fees request in tbat
·mmmer, Additionally, Sytlnga argues that th." State Defondmts have failoo l.Q shaw by clear !1.1.\d

13

convinoing cviden~,e tl1at Syriugu. brought its tort chuu:dn bad filith. In their reply, the State
15

Defondm"t~ atguo 1hatthe defense

of the DOA c~tmot be segregated Ji'om tlla tlef<1nse of Gwartney

l6

and Zickau.

ld!iho Codo § 6-918Apl'DVid$S for aitonieys' foes in a tort action against ll. govenrmental

18

entity or its eroployees when there ia clear md con"l'iucing evidence tl1at the pro:ly against whom

19

tee:; <1Ie sought "was guilty of bad faith in the con.unenccment, condiict, roainietiallcle or def.ense of

20

the actiCiP." ldaho Code § 6-91 SA. Bad foith means dishonesty in belie£ or Ptll'PO$e, B~Bl1for 11.
~2 : .

Frvwmont QJun.;y, 145 Tdaho 656, 661, 182 P.3d 713, 718 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Cordova v.
:

23 '

:Bormwil!~

Co1.1nly Joint Sch. Df:ll. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774, 780 (2007)). The

: decision to award fees under !hls provfaiou is committed to the discxetion oftl1e trial court Idaho
25
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Code § 6·91 BA. the Comt will find 1hat tl1e Stato Defendants have not shown that Syri.nga acted
l

Without a reasofu;hll'l' basis in ]Jiw or fact ot that Syringa acted in bad fbith. As an exercise of its

i

:i · ·diSoretidU, the C¢u,rt will decline to (l.Wm:d attorneys' fees under this

section.

Conclusion
. $

As explaii1ed ahove, the Comt will:

6 .

(l) As to ENA:
~Award E:NA

$11,42.3.60 i11 e-0.te a! 0 inatter of right;

·. D,

·De'cline to awm-d ENA di~cretionary cost1;
·Awni'd ENA attorneys fees Jo the amount of S176,6H.OO for the legal wed(

10
1l

done by lol'd counsel, ~foll, Farl~y, Qhe.rret:bt & Blantoll, l'.A;

12

-Awll\"d ENA atfonle)ll!' ~.as requested fur the legal work: done by out of state

13 '

counse~
rat~

l.5

tirr1dfoy Arant Bault C\umnings, LLP, ~ redue<\d to Nflect ptevailing

far foes in Boise, Idaho.

-Award ENA automated legal reseuch fees i11 the at1101tnt of$2,039.B9 to be

16

fududed ua part offhe nttonieyfee aw!ll:d.
17

(1) A.s to Qwest:
·AW!l!d QweErt 11,787.21 ln costs as a matter of right;
20

•Award Qwest atton'.leys feee in the amount of$63,225.J'T for the legal Work

21

do~1~ by local

2'2

"Award Qwest attomey fees as requested for the legal work done by Oll.t of state

Z3

I

24

:I.

counsel, Mo:ffntt, Tb.omlls, Barrett, Rock & Fwlds, Cb'llt;

counsel, Holme RDbert> & OweJJ, as reduced to reflect prevailing r;ites for tees

in Bois~, l&llo.

:: lj :.
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1.

.-Aw<il:d'.QWest:$l·I;7.S%2.1,in costs as a.1n;1tter ofri@l~;.

-Dec'iine.to:a:wm-d;dlsgeuon.my .~os~ o.r costsJl\USUm:it.:to 1dmio ¢o<lG .§J0·1.21 Q,
.J)ffiine-.to·:i1ward:attarueyf-ee.~.

s:
G·.
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P·.
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CER1WICATE OF MAXLlNG
l

r hereby certify that ori
2

th.,£ ~Y of August 201 l, l nialle<l (served) a true and corrl!~t Oi;ipy of

the wltbm instmmcnt 1:0:

3

DAYID R. LOMBARDI

'4

AMBER N. DINA
GIVENS l'URSLBYLLP

"

·:.·

6

1

'

e
9

. 60 l W B.ANNOCK ST

.PO!IOXZ720
IlOJSJJ, lD 83701-2720
MERLYNW. CLARK.
STiiVEN F. SCHOSSBERGEJt
HAW!'.Jl'/ TROXELL ENNlS&ll'.AWL!h', i,Il'
877 MAJN ST, STE l oao
l'O BOX 1617
.130ISE, ID B370H6!7

10

STB.l'HEN IL THOMAS
M.01'1'ATI' THOMAS .BAARETI' ROCK
1l
& l",IJ,ll,DS, CI'fA.ll.TllllF..D
101SCAPITOLBLVT.l,10TIJ FLOOR
12 · POBOX829
BOISE, ID 8370'l--OS29
13
B. u.wnBNCB Tl\lll!S
14 . STEVEN 1. PllRJIREMENT
HOLME ROBl.!RTS & OWEN TJ,P
1700 IJNCOLN S'nUillT, STll 4100
ls
Dl?N'VER, COLORADO 80203
l6

:PHlLLIP S. OBERFJ:r,CEJ'T

n . LESUBM.G.HAYES
HALL FAA.LEY OBERRECIIT & BLANTON, PA
. ·70?; W IDAf;l:O, STl! 700

is

19

POBOXl.271
..BOISE, ID 8l70!.

:ROB5RT S. PATTERSON
BRAD:LUY ARANT BOtlLT CUMMINGS LLP
1600 DlVISION STll.Bl>T, STB 700
21 1 NASltv:lLLE, 1N 37203

20

22

CHR1STOPBERD, RICJ.t

AZ: ,
Clm1t 0£ tb.1> Di!ittic:t Court

2J

z•
~5

By

.

. ...
~._L
'-Deputy~

26
. ·i MEMOR.ANDOM PECfS!ON AN.D ORDER Rll: COSTS AN1J A1"fQl.l.NEYS' FEES -I'AGli: Z5

Pa~e

B3B

APPENDIX4

-· ,

__ ,

I•

->

12/22/11 13:3B:44 2BB-331J-13BB

RE c·

Hawley Troxell Givens Fursely LLF

Page B31

~-

OCT 2 7 2011
CHHISTOPHE'H 0, t·ilCH, Cleik
By INl;A J01'NSON
f.'."f'.PUTV

IN THE blSTRlOT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUbICIAL DIS'tRICt OF ti:JE
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SYR INGA NETWORKS, LLC, AN Idaho
limited !iilliility cO'mpany,
Case No. CV OC 0923757
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT llE: costs AND
ATJ'OR."lffiY FEES

vs,

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION; J, MICHAEL "MIKE"
GWARTNEY, Jn his personal Md official ,,
capacity as Director and Chief lllfonnatio11
Ofllcef oCtbe Idaho Depru-tment of
A:Llminislnliion; JACK a. "OREO" ZICK.AU,
in his personal official capacity of Chief
TechucJogy Officer and Admh\istmtor of the
. Office ofth·e ClO; ENA SERVfCES, LLC, a
DiviSion of EbUCAT ION NBTWORKS OF
AMl:.llUCA, INC. a Delaware corpowtion;
QWEST COMMUNICA't!ONS COMPANY,
U,C, a belaware lim(ted liabllity compll.ny,
Defendimts.

---·-·~-----~----~~-

Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs lll!d Attorney fees,

entered on August 4, 20 l l, aod good cause appearing:

IT IS HE'.REBY ORDERED, ADJUDGJ")D AND DECREED that judgment is entered
in fuvor of de.fundant EN A and State defendants and against Plaintiff us follows:
J!lDOMBNT RE: COSTS AND ATfORNBY FEES • I

'
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E/ii'tl '.J:,o</al Cew1s¢t ..l\tlDEi:rc:ys' .·fees.-aw~rd'ed·in .t11e:amom1t .of$.J.76,6 I.3.0();,

00 Oiir.of8/ai'li'Ct1U11sef Attom~ys:•·'ft;es. awi1rded:!uthe' ao.i:ount:of$1 f3/iQO;,.and
!tN.il. .Olit.fl[Stat~"Cow.M# :f;;e-galP..e~eardi ~~.OJ9:8)1, .

.lutfgtncnUn favqi· Gf'.def~.iul:ant·BNAi $3!tl,576A9..
Stote.!!q.fo!)tla)11fl·j)O.sWii.S .a·inMter of,dght:'!a tire· in tlie:'lllnoutu ofSll /i 87 '21;.
ifudgnlei'it'ln· f'a~d.r t'lf Stiite :dl!fon•flilllil:. :S:i t7S'1,u~

DA:.TED:ihl~ Z2.-01ry :of\%p~~r, 2\lJL
flATRICIC H. OWEN
·~~~~.,.....,.~~~~·~

Hon.orabli:! P.atrick.:1.. Owen
l:Hstriet.Judg(l.•

,.
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CERilF.ICATE OF Sl?Ji.YJSJ:i

oc,L

1,.,

I HEREBY CERTIFY Lhat on the .JtJ::. day of l:lepte;:;1ber, 20 l l, .{ caused to be Served a
true copy of 1he foregoing JUDGMENT n:E: COSTS AND A'J"fORNEY FEtS, by !ho
m"'thod indicated belDW, ~i1<l addressed to each of the following:
J

David R. Lombardi
Amber N. Dina
GIVENS PlJRSLEY LLP

-~

-.-

1501 W, Hannock

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
OverJligllt Muil
Tetce-0py

p, O. Box '2720

Boise, TD 8370 l
Fax: (208} J 88· 1'.lOO

L

Jvierlyil W, Clark
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNTS &
HAWLEYLLP

877 W Maio St, Ste l 000
l'OBox 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

-

-.

U.S. Mail, Postnge Frep~id
Hand Deliv~red
Overnight Mall
Te!ecopy

Fax: (208) 954-5210

/

Stephen R. Thmuas
MOFFATT THOMAS BAR.RJ:rrr ROCK
& JOJELDS CHARTERED
10 I S Capitol Blvd, J Dth Fl
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 8:>701-0829

U.S. MaiJ, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ov~rnight Mail

Teic:copy

Fi\X: (208) 3B'J-5384

B. Lawr~nce Theis
Steven l'erfremcnt
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100
))euvet, CO 80203
Fax: (303) 866--0200

U.S. Mrul, Po$l~ge Prepaid
Hand Delivereu
Overnight Mail
Teleoopy

Phillip $, O\Jcrrecht
Leslib M. Hay~s
Hall, Farfoy, Obenecht & l:l!anto11, PA
PO Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701-1!.71
Fox: (208) 395-8585

U.S, Mllil,.'('ostage PtepQ.id
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mall
Telecopy

CHRISTOPHER D. RIC
!NGA JOHNiON
Deputy Clerk

J1JDGMBNt RE: COSTS AND A17011.NEY FEES·)
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JVJ::z:r.q s i«~b.........,_ _
Stephen It 'rhonJA>, ISB No. 2326
MOFJ;>Ar-t, THOMAS, BARRETl', ROCK &flELDS, CHARTERED
t 0 I S. Capitol Blvd., 10"' Floor
Post Offico Box 829
Bois.::, Idaho 8370 I
Telephoi1c (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
.rf't@moffatr.com

DEC 15 2011
By c~,OterK

FiE'.C:EIVED
p1~·;,.J.,_,1

I ''0 ...'lnj·J
~I

13, J..aw:reu<;e Theis (Pro Hae Vic~)
Steven J. Perfrcmcl\t Wro Hue Vice)
HdLMBROllERTS & OWEN LLP

1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100
·oeu:ver, Comr(ldo 80203
Telephone (303) 861-7000
Fac;;imifo (303) 866-0200

larry.rhels@hro.com
sreven.parfromertl@hro.com
Attori1eya for Defendant Qwost
Commu11!.cations Company, LLC

IN THE DIST!UCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUN'"rV OF .ADA
SYRINGA NETWORKS. LLC, an Idaho limited

liability company,

CnseNo.CV OC 0923757
Pluintiff,

\Is,

JDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ADMINJSTRATrON;
], MICHAEJ, "MIKE" GWARTN.EY, in hi~ personal
and official capacity ns Director tllld Chief
lnfonnation Officer of tho ldnho DGJ'!lrtment of
Admlltlstration; JACK G. "GJUlG" ZICKAU, in his
personal and official cnJ)acity as ChicfTccJmology
Officet and Adminislrator of the Office of the CIO;
ENA SERVICES, LJ,C, a Divisloll of EDUCATION
NEIWORKS OF AME!UCA, Inc., a Delawme
corporatioll; QWEST COMMllNICATIONS
,
COMPANY, LLC, n D~law3l:o ~imi1ed liabili~tyI

company,

·

Defendants.
.

At'1.l!lNDED JUDGMENT RE:
COSl'S AND ATTORNEY l1EES

.

~DED J'ttDGMENT RE:
M1!m .to.,

.
.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - l
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Based Upoii this Court'B Memorill:ldum Decision !l1ld Order .Re: Costs and Attorney Fees,
·enter~

ou A11gust 4, 2011, nnd good oouse app~ai:ing;

rt JS HEREiiY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND D.li:CREED tbJ!tjUdf:>!11Cllt i.s entered
•

i.p fuvor of defundont EN A and State deJ:bidants and. aguinst Plait;tiff as follows:
·'-

_-

ENA Co.its as •Hl1iltter ofright in the amount of$1 l,423.60;
ENA Local Counsel Attorneys' tees aWITTded in the amount of$ l 76,6i3.00;

ENA Out of State Counsel Attorneys' feeS awarded in ·U1e l\Jl1C)li11t of$1 l3,500; and
ENA ()\Jc of State Cou11,:;e) Legal Rest1•1r<;h $2,.039Jl9 .
•rudgment in (11'\'or of dofcndnut RNA:

$393.576.49.

State Defeo.d<lnts cos!~ 11,' a mAlter o.fright to the fo the amount of $9.904.65:
Judgment u1 favor of State defenda.uts:
Qwe~c

$2,904.65.

O:rsts nil a matter otrigbt in the amoMI: of $11,7$7,21;

. Qwest Local Ca1111s!ll Attomcys' feiis awru:ded in the amount of$63,225.77;
Qwest 011t of State Counsel Attorneys' fees awarded in 1be an:to\Illt of $303,210.50;
'

DATED chis 14 day of December, 2011.
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